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EDITORIAL NOTES

READERS of the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' *The Fourth Gospel* (of which we hope shortly to publish a review by Professor C. H. Dodd) will have been struck by its frequent allusions to the work of Adolf Schlatter. Schlatter is not very well known in England, and we are glad to be able to publish an article on his theology. As long ago as in 1915 Dr J. K. Mozley[1] deplored the fact that none of Schlatter's books had been translated into English. None has been translated yet.

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We recently quoted in these Notes a letter from an Oxford undergraduate which reflected doubts that are widespread in the student world. The article on "The Church in Politics after the War" comes from Cambridge; it is certainly more sanguine, and perhaps more constructive. Mr Montague overlooks the fact that the Council of the Churches on the Christian Faith and the Common Life, which has been set up since the Oxford Conference of 1937, is designed to do more or less what he proposes. The Council, however, has so far done little to attract attention, apart from launching *The Christian News-Letter*, and is hardly in a position to do more until much larger resources are set at its disposal. If Mr Montague is right in saying that "there is no lack of economic, nor indeed of any kind of technical, knowledge within the Church," it is not yet being drawn upon to good effect, but we wonder if he is right. Moreover, if the Church is along these lines to make an impact on the social order, why wait until after the war? In a recent *C. N.-L. Supplement* (No. 29) Professor Löwe argued that the direction of social change will be determined during the war itself, and that the opportunity which exists now will have disappeared if it is not seized at once.

[1] See *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, p. 56, n. 3.

The Biblical Theology of Adolf Schlatter

This article is meant as a contribution to the discussion on biblical theology which has been going on in this journal for some time. The intention is not to develop a new scheme for a biblical theology but to describe one which already exists in the theological work of Adolf Schlatter (1852-1938). His theology can be called biblical in a very strict sense. The fulness and richness of Schlatter's work make it impossible to go into details here. I shall try only to bring out clearly the general trend of his theology as a biblical theology and to show how this trend penetrates and animates his whole work, giving to it unity and wholeness.

At the outset I want to emphasize those features of Schlatter's theology that differentiate it from the types of German Protestant theology which are more familiar to readers in this country.

1. Schlatter's theology has no doctrines and no system, he would even reject them vehemently. He is convinced that reality means history, " das Geschehen," that which is coming to pass or the flux of events, the individual facts in the here and now, that which is given to us. Our thoughts, ideas, doctrines and systems are far too narrow to embrace this fulness of history. Far, very far indeed, from underestimating our power of reasoning, he attributes to it only a serving rôle in our attempt to acquire knowledge. " My logic is based on the sentence that the history of thought is a part of the history of life, and that any act of thinking has its foundation in an act of living." " Religion is history, divine action which gives us life, will and activity." As the last sentence already indicates, this attitude is deeply rooted in his Christian consciousness of God as gained from a continuous intercourse with the New Testament. What and how much that actually means I shall try to explain fully in a later section.

2. There is one fact with which Schlatter is very much concerned. The Reformation and traditional Protestantism have not altogether failed to see nature and history as the work of God. But this insight of Christian faith remained theoretical and abstract. It did not possess the power to guide us in acquiring knowledge and philosophical thought; it rather narrowed our approach to the full reality of God's creation and action. " Not nature only, and not only the

Christ, but both of them were before my eyes as the work of God, so that I had not only a natural theology nor only a Christology, but I had them both." And the sentence: "What Christ makes of us may be something different from humanity, it may transform and perfect it, but not destroy it," seems to be very near to Thomas Aquinas: "Gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit." But we have to be extremely careful here and to realize that Schlatter does not use the words "nature" and "natural theology" as they have been traditionally used. The idea of *theologia naturalis—e.g.*, in medieval Scholasticism—is deeply influenced by Greek philosophy. But there is a deep gulf which cannot be bridged between the Greek consciousness of God and the Christian consciousness of God. And Schlatter sees one of his important tasks in entirely eliminating Greek rationalism from his theology.

"The falsification of our thinking into Rationalism is the burden with which the Greek method of thinking has loaded us. The Greek undertaking to master the world by conceptions is worthy of admiration. That day, when man was understood as a 'rational being,' remains a great event in the religious history of mankind. Our essence, the divine part in us, was conceived as that knowledge, as that ability to think and to comprehend, as that possession of categories by which we form what fills our sensation, and make the world our property by 'comprehending' it. But equally we should clearly distinguish that this attitude does not reveal the greatness but the poorness, not the power but the weakness of man. For it arises out of the discord which makes the world the enemy of the self, the subject the adversary of the object, the conception contradict reality and history. And this discord not only severs our relationship to the world, but splits the self in itself and thus reveals that our relationship to God is not union but disunion, not reconciliation but revolution."

"If Jesus' work gets hold of us and His Sonship of God awakens our consciousness of God," we meet the living God who is "will-power, power of thinking, consciousness and an acting person," who reveals Himself in history. He is the God who—according to St John—completely united Himself with the man Jesus, who speaks His word through Jesus and in doing so puts man before Him as the one who listens, and dismisses man's attempt to elevate himself to God through his own knowledge. For knowledge ceases

to be something acquired by man himself. He can see only by the light that comes to him. "As the word makes man hear, so the light gives him the power of perceiving out of which knowledge arises."

If we turn from the Greek idea to the Christian God, our attitude must needs change completely from the desire to dominate to the wish to serve, from the ardent longing to do our own work, to "create," to the patient and thankful receiving of that which is given to us by the Creator. And so Schlatter's Yes to nature, which is a very assured one, is the Yes of somebody who is first bound to Christ. He—according to the report of one of his oldest pupils—consistently pointed to the word of Jesus and of the apostles as the work of God, on which we should keep our eye unceasingly fixed, if we want to see God's work in His creation. Schlatter's approach to nature and history as the work of God is beyond a one-sided Catholic or Protestant tradition. It is expounded in his *Christliche Dogmatik*, but most of his ideas are scattered in occasional remarks over the numerous volumes of his big commentaries on the New Testament. There is a vast material here waiting for research. An investigation of the actual meaning of his attempt might indeed be an important step towards overcoming the differences which separate Catholicism and Protestantism here and towards leading them into the wider unity demanded by the fulness of the New Testament message.

3. There is another point in which he differs from the Protestant tradition—namely, in his interpretation of St Paul's theology. He dealt with it once in his first great work on the New Testament *Der Glaube im Neuen Testament* (1885) and finally in his commentary on the epistle to the Romans which has the significant title *Gottes Gerechtigkeit* (1935). He himself considered this book the most important of all his commentaries. The significance of his work on St Paul, which touches on nearly every problem of New Testament theology, can scarcely be overestimated. It shows a deep understanding of what St Paul means by faith. I will mention here only one important conclusion: Paul's "righteousness alone by faith" does not neglect but rather necessitates the doing of works. "He who has become obedient to God by faith and has so been found by his Lord who is Christ will become the doer of works in a new and incomparably greater degree than in the natural state." And "God is the willing and

the acting, and will is therefore the central process in human life. And the will is, if not hampered and spoiled, the author of deed to which man is constantly called, since he lives for and through his community and does not exist isolated for himself. For that reason the process which builds up man's relationship to God and to his fellow-men is deed." And of course to him who believes in Christ it is not his own work but Christ's gift, His work through him. Thus Schlatter's exegesis supplies the foundation for a Christian ethics. He even insists that the fulness of the New Testament message demands a Christian ethics which leads us in building up our Christian community. And with regard to the modern (1925) situation in the German Protestant Church he remarks: " Was the uneasiness vain which worried me when I saw a strong obstacle in the limitation of an ethics which only wards off evil but does not create good, which teaches how to die but does not plant life. The school which aimed at the education of the child arose beyond the Church and in contradiction to it, since the idea that the child might be helped in developing his abilities and in entering his full life was beyond the limit which the Church's ethics reached. We got those deformities which we call capitalism, etc. Advice to those who are in need was always given by the Church, but she had no doctrine of how we should earn our living and of how we should make use of our earnings. . . . She did not see any task in connexion with the nation."

While I was writing the previous sections I constantly had in mind the recent criticism of the biblical revival in this country by Mr Mascall:[1] " And it has not yet shaken itself free from a tendency to express itself not in terms of traditional Anglican theology, but in those of Continental Lutheranism and Calvinism." This criticism seems to overlook the real problem which is not only one of language but goes much deeper. Biblical theology in pointing unceasingly to Christ has to remind us that He is the Lord over any Church and its tradition and so has to make us willing to submit our tradition to His judgment. Schlatter illustrates this task of biblical theology in his attempt to overcome the narrowness of the Reformation without losing its great insight: the free-giving grace of God in proclaiming

[1] E. L. Mascall, THEOLOGY, vol. 39, 1939, p. 408.

His righteousness in Jesus Christ. " Criticism of the Reformation and of Luther is indispensable to complete the Reformation." This criticism means the unceasing confrontation of our theological thought with the New Testament, not interpreted by any kind of mystical experience, not interpreted by philosophy, but interpreted by itself, by faith given to us through Christ's Word. Nearness to the New Testament would be for Schlatter a sign of the truth of a biblical theology. This attitude obviously affects his language and his theological terms. These are both formed by the New Testament. He deliberately abstains—for instance, very strikingly in his commentary on the epistle to the Romans—from using the current terms of the theological schools, Calvinistic or Lutheran (one might easily be caught in them). He gives us here a lead which should remind us of the critical function of biblical theology towards any tradition. Biblical theology—without breaking with tradition or disregarding it—should find its own language through unceasing intercourse with the New Testament and a language spoken to our own time.

Schlatter in his theology, as we now realize, makes one decisive presupposition: he considers himself entirely bound to Jesus as the Christ and the Lord, and the life and death of Jesus, the Messiah, means for him a real and unique fact of history in which God reveals His grace and kingly rule. That is to say, from the very beginning he submits to the claim[1] of the whole New Testament which is asking for a decision, and a life or death decision, in response to God's revelation. " I was among those who see the everlasting grace of God in the acts of Jesus, and who therefore have to accept Him as their Lord; I was a Christian—not a perfect one, but compelled to live by faith and by faith alone. But by faith I thought and I lived." And this faith is willing, acting faith as we know already from his interpretation of St Paul. It is most remarkable how this being bound to Jesus, the very centre of his theology, consistently and persistently penetrates and dominates his whole work. " My position as a Christian I can describe only with the simple word of St John: to hear the Word of Jesus and to observe it." " To observe " here stands for the Greek verb τηρεῖν, the idea of which, according to

[1] Sir E. Hoskyns and N. Davey, *The Riddle of the New Testament*, 1936, pp. 226-227.

Westcott,[1] " appears to be that of watchful heed to an object which claims, so to speak, a living observance, a service not of the letter but of the spirit." We shall see in the following sections how this living observance of the Word of Jesus, this service, determines Schlatter's extended work on the New Testament, his dogmatics and his ethics.

His whole theology is held together by his being bound to Jesus. He is aiming all the time at a " theology of faith " —*i.e.*, such a kind of scientific research as is founded on and guided by faith given to us by Jesus. " He who believes desires to receive, he is poor in himself." He is bound to Jesus by knowing Him, and he knows Him through the New Testament. Thus we come to the very heart of Schlatter's theology: how does he read the New Testament? " The inward process of reading is hearing. That was my duty and my service to God, to listen to Jesus and His aposties, to listen so that their thoughts became my thoughts and their word my word. I had one aim only—to read, to read the New Testament, not only to hear others talk about it, not only to hear our own thoughts about it which originate from the New Testament, but to hear those whose word comes to us in it. Hearing leads us to faith, and the fact that we hear, this is our righteousness before God. Was that science? In reading the New Testament for myself and with the young and the Church it was my aim that it might say to us what it says, and that no alien voice should interfere; and that gave the true scientific character to my teaching. Thus we find ourselves asked to sacrifice ideas familiar to us for a long time and to overcome impelling desires so that we may devote ourselves with determination to the object. Perception is demanded from us which is the root of all thinking. Judgment is demanded from us by which what we receive becomes our possession. But judgment comes second, for it is liable to create phantoms unless we have first purely and determinedly devoted ourselves to perceiving. And thus thoroughly and obediently prepared to hear we turn towards the New Testament, towards the fullest and most mighty word that has ever been spoken, to the word which gives us the divine promise that through it God reveals Himself to us, and through it He shows us not only one of His works but the glory of His all-fulfilling grace. Here to listen is science."

[1] B. F. Westcott, *The Epistles of St John*, 3rd ed., 1892, p. 47.

" Is it not an aim, overhigh and unattainable, to become related to an object so that it shows itself to us? The object of theology is God and it therefore undoubtedly has the power to reveal itself to us, and all sincere devotion to it will bear fruit." This concentration on the text which does not lend an ear to any alien voice and does not go beyond that which is shown to us, bestows a unique power and greatness on Schlatter's New Testament exegesis. Here Jesus and His apostles are present, speaking to their own time and thus revealing the mighty deeds of God and His unceasingly giving grace. For here is the Gospel of the Lord Christ " the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth " in its acting reality. And so it speaks to our own time making the most vivid and urgent appeal to our decision: " For life originates from life and will from will. With the individual personal life of those who speak to us in the New Testament our individual personal life originates. It obtains in our historical position its unrepeatable peculiarity and still remains akin to its progenitor since His Word creates in us His image." This strictness of his exegesis is, for instance, most beautifully illustrated by his exposition of John i, 1-18 (*Der Evangelist Johannes*, 1930).

This kind of reading and hearing points to history and entails a scholarly work of the highest quality. " For the intercourse with the New Testament my receiving attitude towards history imposed two rules on me: to pay attention, first, to the concrete meaning and individuality of the New Testament words and events and, secondly, to the surrounding life."

The environment of Jesus and His disciples was the Palestinian Jewry. So Schlatter studies unceasingly not only the topography of Palestine but also what remains of the old rabbinic theology, devotional literature and sermons. He studies what remains of the Greek synagogue. He studies Philo, he studies Josephus, but all this never for its own sake but solely in order to read and to repeat to our own time the New Testament word with a deeper insight, to be nearer to Jesus, to touch His garments like the woman in Mark v, 28: " For she said, if I touch but His garments, I shall be made whole."

The concrete meaning of the New Testament word is embodied in the New Testament language. It is the parallelism between the Palestinian Semitism and the New Testament Greek which attracts Schlatter's attention. In his two

important scientific commentaries which are equally great in their power of exegesis and in their scholarly thoroughness *Der Evangelist Matthäus* (1929) and *Der Evangelist Johannes* (1930) he produces all the material which shows the bilingual character of their language. The linguistic evidence consists in two sets of observations: (1) a negative one: the evangelists' language is compared with Josephus' Greek which aimed at being the educated Greek of the school; it differs very widely from it. (2) A positive one: Schlatter finds a striking similarity between the evangelists' Greek and the contemporary Palestinian Aramaic of the Targums, not only in conceptions and ideas but even in the formal parts of the speech, in its grammar. This is explained by the fact that all who talk here, not only Matthew and John but also the Palestinian Rabbis, speak alternatively Greek and Aramaic. So Greek is assimilated to Aramaic as Aramaic to Greek. The importance of this work of Schlatter's as a contribution to semasiology can scarcely be overrated.[1]

The few remarks here made by no means indicate the compass of Schlatter's scientific work and cannot do justice to its importance, which was worthily recognized by Kittel and his collaborators when they dedicated to him the first volume of the great work *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament.* The tendency of this standard work of biblical theology is strongly influenced by Schlatter.

The New Testament studies—the reading of the New Testament and all that it entails according to the foregoing section, and the repeating of the New Testament word in the language of our time—are the foundation and the centre of biblical theology, but they are only a part of it. New Testament faith according to Schlatter is always active faith through love. Therefore the theologian is compelled to do more than aim at the right understanding of the New Testament. He has to attempt to solve the problems of his own time in the light of his understanding of the New Testament. In other words, New Testament theology which is the learned kerygma has to be completed by teaching (dogmatics) and moral instruction (ethics).

So he writes *Das Christliche Dogma* in 1911 which is far remote from the liberal theology of his time. There he insists too on a criticism, a constructive one, of the theology

[1] For the last paragraph comp. Hoskyns and Davey, *op. cit.*, chap. 1.

of the great Reformers and the Reformation. As we have seen already at the beginning of this article, he is very much concerned with the fact that the Protestant tradition weakened the power of the thought of God as the creator: " I tried to expound the facts on which the ' Christian Dogma '—those convictions which unite us as a Church—is founded. In doing this work which attempted to show for which Christian doctrine we have to plead to-day, I had in mind the high aim of making visible in the same way the two actions of God, by which He creates us and by which He gives us His grace, the one which is transmitted through nature and history, and the one which is transmitted through Christ." He who hopes to find in Schlatter's book a treatise on dogmatics, a " summa " will be thoroughly disappointed. It is rather a striking example of his scientific method on which we already touched when dealing with his reading the New Testament. The attitude of the faithful Christian who, in acquiring knowledge, can see only by the light that comes to him, is different from that of the Greek: " We are not allowed to detach our thinking from reality, and our arbitrary production of conceptions and ideas is made a sin to us. Receiving—that process which we call seeing—comes first, before we start forming and shaping our own ideas. This attitude is a kind of resignation, for our consciousness of God forbids us to exceed that which is shown to us." So observation has the first place in our scientific work. But this resignation does not mean that we should not make use of our power of judgment, of our capacity of origination and of our will. " My standpoint is not naive. It is critical of the critic. Capacity of origination and will are given to us and we are called upon to form judgments " for the sake of knowledge as well as for the sake of moral acts. Observation is scientific observation only if it makes use of the systematizing power of our thinking to see, together with the concrete single fact, the totality. " A system is a totality in which the fulness of observations is penetrated and formed by a unity." He is very much afraid of any premature systematizing which, neglecting observations, pretends to create knowledge by adapting our different thoughts to each other. We have to keep open our eyes for any new fact, and we have to be ready to accept the criticism that a new observation brings to bear on our attempt to systematize. It needs a considerable intellectual courage: " This courage is rooted

in the confidence that the system of knowledge is founded in the reality of its object." One, somewhat hesitatingly, might say that his philosophy, if such a thing exists, is a kind of realism. His idea of totality is of great power, it is elastic and adaptable and therefore nearer to life than rationalism: " As a theologian I am fundamentally observer and not syllogist. Observation has to do with simultaneous events which continually come into contact with each other, which mutually determine each other, which do not originate from each other by succession, but which only *together* make our life." This last sentence is the very clue to the right understanding of Schlatter's writings.

Das Christliche Dogma was followed by *Die Christliche Ethik*, about eight years later. For him the New Testament message necessitates an ethics since faith includes deed. And this demand was made very urgent by the fact that the ethics which originated from the doctrine of the Reformation failed at this point. It " did not proceed beyond rejecting evil, and was unable to show the positive will of God that we have to do." We have already said so much about it above that it will be sufficient here to refer to a sentence of Schlatter's in which he, with regard to philosophical ethics, indicates the general aim of his own ethics: " My conception of ethics aimed at overcoming a mere abstract norm which is lacking in reality and compelling power. To make visible the glory of the divine grace was its aim. And it does so by making us, in daily tasks, the instrument of God in an act of willing love and insight."

Neither in his dogmatics nor in his ethics does Schlatter bind us to a creed, a system of doctrines or to moral laws. He binds us finally and solely everywhere to Jesus the Lord, to the living Christ as experienced through the word of the New Testament. " From the Christ the one Catholic and Holy Church originates, Catholic since the Christ is Lord over all men, Holy since He delivers us from evil and reconciles us to God." Differences in doctrine should not separate Christians and Churches so long as they have in common the one Lord and the one book, the Holy Scripture, and they all pray the Lord's Prayer. There is only one reason which can justify separation—namely, if our obedience to Christ is endangered. This ecumenical attitude of Schlatter's is only a part of something which is much greater—the freedom of the bondservant. For him the Church should be " a brightly burning fire of freedom."

And what this freedom is for him he clearly says in expounding Gal. v, 13: "Christ has freed us. . . . The believer has realized that he is Christ's. He who is Christ's is the servant of God. All that he possesses is God's; he has received it from Him. . . . The aim of his actions is beyond his own self and is derived from the will of God. And this being-a-servant-of-God makes him free." This obedience in thought and deed, this willingness to receive, to listen to the New Testament kerygma, imposes the strictest self-discipline on his thoughts in rejecting any voice alien to the voice of Christ and His apostles—he occasionally calls it a constant dying to self. This is what makes his theology a biblical theology. He imposes this dying to self on theological and Church tradition too as an act of repentance in the constant intercourse with the New Testament through which and in which we are confronted with Christ.

The inheritance which he left to his Church under oppression—his last book *Kennen wir Jesus?*, written in 1937—is a devotional book of daily readings in which he, for the last time, tries to show us Jesus Christ as witnessed to in the New Testament and through Him the fulness of God's giving grace. Here you have his theology in the two sentences which open the book: "Do we know Jesus? If the knowledge of Him vanishes we do not know ourselves."

WERNER STEINER.

Morals and the Modern Novel

A REPORTER is said to have asked Mr Bernard Shaw which twelve men or women he would choose to save if he were Noah and there was going to be another flood: "I'd let them all drown," Mr Shaw replied. This is probably no more authentic than most of the stories which used to be told about Mr Shaw, when such stories were popular, but it is a useful, if grotesque, illustration of the moral point of view of the pre-war generation. In effect, the Shavian conscience is concerned as to whether it would be to the benefit of the community to save these people, not as to whether there is any moral obligation to save them. And

this is the attitude of a group of novelists (who may for convenience be called " pre-war ") including Mr Wells, Galsworthy and Bennett. They are concerned with the relationship of a man to society; never with the relationship of a man to God, nor even, for the most part, with the relationship of a man to himself. Materialists often argue that their system of ethics is in effect the same as christian morality—and indeed such sins in the christian sense, as sloth, gluttony, and even lechery, are obviously anti-social—but this is merely begging the question. It amounts to saying that it doesn't matter what a man does by himself in a field behind a wall, so long as he doesn't knock the wall down.

The pre-war novelists were great students of walls, from the elegant brick of Galsworthy to the drystone slate of the " Mr Polly " of Mr Wells, but behind the walls their characters live without purpose. When it no longer matters what a man does, except in so far as it affects his fellows, then the actions of his life become unimportant, and inevitably dull as ditchwater. Towards the end of the six-volume history of the Forsytes, we begin to realize the terrible lack of significance in the lives of the younger members of that family. Galsworthy's skill and sympathy cannot conceal the fact that he is writing about people who know within themselves that it does not matter how they live or how they die, because it does not really matter that they have been born at all.

Lawrence revolted violently against that materialism. He proclaimed with the exuberance of the ancient pagan worshippers that the world of the spirit was behind and around and within the world of matter. He reacted against the dulness of materialism, and shouted that every single action, every single minute of man's life was wildly and appallingly significant. It mattered so much to him what a man did behind the wall, that he denied that the wall need be there at all, and tried to prove his point by kicking down walls in all directions. Except in the passages of rather clever talk which are occasionally found in his novels (especially in the first half-dozen chapters) we rarely find that a character in a mature work of Lawrence acts in a way which seems casual or unimportant. Incidents, slight in themselves, shine out as with a strange symbolic significance. A man throwing stones at the reflection of the moon, a girl frightened by horses in the dark, a horse scared of a train at level crossings, a boy shooting a fox—these are all

incidents which are almost incredibly moving and which have a part in a pattern bigger than that merely of their consequences.

That the individual's choice of action was with Lawrence a matter of morality, and not merely of expediency, is admirably shown in the new *Everyman* volume edited by Mr Desmond Hawkins.[1] In "The Fox," in many ways Lawrence's most finished story, each climax (the shooting of the fox, the proposal, the felling of the tree) is seen as part of a moral crisis in the life of the boy who is the chief character. The fact that his moral judgments may seem to us to be wrong does not alter that, and the fact that Lawrence relates them with unusual (for him) reserve actually emphasizes it. The shift of interest from the society to the individual which makes so great a difference between Lawrence and the work of the previous generation can be seen by comparing "The Lovely Lady," a story in the *Everyman* volume, with the earlier "Sons and Lovers." "Sons and Lovers" is, of course, very unlike anything that might have been written by Galsworthy or Mr Wells, but it shows the lives of Paul Morel and his mother moulded by circumstances which they cannot control, and for which neither they nor anyone else (unless it be, unconsciously, the father) is to blame. They are as helpless in the grip of these circumstances as are the characters of some of Galsworthy's plays in the grip of the economic or judicial system. "The Lovely Lady," one of Lawrence's later stories, deals with a theme similar to that of "Sons and Lovers," the hold of the mother over her son, in a way which emotionally bleeds the latter, and makes him unable to face the world as an adult, and, in particular, to face the responsibility of the love of women. But in "The Lovely Lady" this situation is the result of a deliberate moral choice on the part of the mother—a choice which

[1] *Stories, Essays and Poems*, by D. H. Lawrence (Everyman's Library, Dent, 2s.): Mr Hawkins has made a brilliant selection which contains examples of Lawrence's work in almost every style and at each stage of development. The stories include "The White Stocking," "England, My England," and "The Woman Who Rode Away"; and there are also examples of travel essays, criticism, poems, ranging from the Georgian to the satirical, and a most illuminating choice of letters. There is an admirable little introduction, which should make the volume, like the same editor's selection of Donne, particularly useful to W.E.A. classes and similar institutions.

Lawrence condemns as evil in some of his most caustic writing. For years this theme had been in his mind, almost to the extent of an obsession (we find it even in that very early work *A Collier's Friday Night*, which was not published until 1934), but the memory of his own mother was so precious to him, that when dealing with the theme in fiction he would never deliberately lay the blame on the mother, until " The Lovely Lady," and then only when he had created a character so unlike Mrs Morel that there was no danger of her being recognized, even by Lawrence himself.

Lawrence's reaction against the materialism of his time expressed itself, among other forms, in his restatement (overstatement, if you like) of the importance of sex. This was not merely, as it has so often been explained, a revolt from the intellectual towards the sensual, nor from the " scientific " outlook of the nineteenth century towards the implications of the poetical, the religious, the mystical; it was also a revolt against the materialist point of view which said that sex did not matter. Lawrence had no sympathy with the casual amorous amusements of a William Clissold, and for those who regarded sex as a matter of eugenics and physical hygiene he had the greatest horror.

Lawrence was essentially a man who could not practise what he preached. There is nothing extraordinary about that: a celibate priest can rightly give advice on marriage. Richard Aldington says that Lawrence was trying to discover what constitutes an ideal marriage. This is probably over-simplifying the problem, but certainly Lawrence was trying in his way to find a normal life for a normal man, or for what he imagined was a normal man. But it is obvious that Lawrence was not a normal man, nor even what he imagined was a normal man. At heart he may have been an ascetic. Certainly we find over and over again that he forced himself into sex: " I was *crucified* into sex," he says. He chose deliberately the experiences of the senses as a way to get in touch (in his own phrase) with his Dark Gods, and perverted as that may sound and perverted as that actually may have been, there was yet a moral decision behind it: he did this because he felt he ought to.

It is no use, of course, to pretend that Lawrence's attitude to sex is the Christian attitude. Nevertheless, his outlook on life is not so antagonistic to Christianity as most people

(including probably himself) thought. *The Man Who Died*, for all its blasphemy, expresses, more poignantly than anything written since the beginning of the century, the experience of spiritual death and rebirth, of what Mr Middleton Murry calls being "twice born." No man of our time was more capable of comprehending the Christian doctrine than was Lawrence. If the spiritual experience behind *The Man Who Died* had been consecrated, it would have been closer than anything else in modern literature to the words of St Paul: "We are buried with him by baptism, for to die, that likewise as Christ was raised up from death by the glory of the Father: even so we also should walk in a new life" (using Tyndale's translation because of its active tense). There is also to be taken into account Lawrence's last work, *Apocalypse*. On the first glance, it may seem an attempt to apply to the Book of Revelation the same sort of psycho-analytical criticism previously seen in *Studies in American Classic Literature*, but it shows, at any rate, that Lawrence had been thinking deeply about those symbols which are associated (though not exclusively) with the Christian religion. With Lawrence the acceptance of the symbol was of more importance than the acceptance of the fact.

Lawrence was the antidote to the materialist heresy, but the misunderstanding of Lawrence helped to give rise to an immorality in the novel far more serious in its effect than the cheerful a-morality of Bennett and Mr Wells. More serious, because, instead of merely ignoring morality, it has tried to substitute a false set of values. A curious new kind of sentimentalism has crept into the minds of the patrons of thousands of the twopenny libraries, like a film over the eyes, like grease congealed between them and the world. Commonplace emotion is blown up like a bubble of soapy water distorting and blurring the vision, so that the heroine of many a Book Society choice is presented as if she were Cleopatra, and the author often imagines that this is a reason for the excesses of a Cleopatra.

This is the wrong sort of escape. We can respect the man who chooses to forget his city surroundings and city routine by reading a detective story or a Wild Western, an historical novel or a travel book. These are not only invigorating, they are often in the long run not really "escape" at all, for, as in *Robinson Crusoe*, they present the problems of everyday life, simplified and placed in a strange setting.

This is the sort of thing that the films could, if they wished, do splendidly, and perhaps for the majority of people, even the great majority, this is the best form of imaginative entertainment. The revolver shot in the dark, the straight left to the jaw, the tiger behind the tree, all presented in a framework of justice as stark as the ten commandments, are likely to do no more harm than to encourage a few schoolboys to play outrageous tricks with water-pistols. But most of our popular fiction for the so-called cultured classes provides escape, not by showing new scenes but by falsifying the old. It is as if a man sought relief from the monotony of an office, not by looking out of the window into the garden, or the street, or the yard, but by putting on distorting spectacles (*rose-coloured* spectacles probably !) and living in a world which is not only unreal but untrue.

Mr Charles Morgan naturally receives the greatest amount of criticism for this type of fiction, because he has by far the best technique of any of the writers of his sort, and because his work has imposed itself on many readers who are normally more discriminating. Mr Morgan's best-known book, *The Fountain*, is in many ways well written. He knows how to direct and manipulate his jet of water so that it falls gracefully and throws up a mist in which the sunlight blurs like shot-silk and hides the perhaps intimidating sight of the street. But in the end the best comment on *The Fountain* is contained in a story told by Brother George Every of a country parson, who, having read it, said: " In my young days we called it adultery and had done with it." Mr Morgan does not call it adultery, nor does he have done with it for three hundred pages. In *Sparkenbroke*, the novel which followed *The Fountain*, Mr Morgan gives the game away. The chief character of the novel is a poet, whose supposed greatness does not take in the reader for a moment, and whose life is built upon his false disguise as a Byronic figure.

This bogus attitude to life, the dangers of it, and the sin of it, are brilliantly allegorized in *Descent into Hell*, the last published novel of Mr Charles Williams. He expresses himself in the terms usually associated with Gomorrah, and tells how a man, who is in love with a girl, is visited by a creature who is exactly like her in form and feature but is really a product of his own imagination. In his description of that association, Mr Williams sees through to the degradation which is beneath the crust of pleasure, and in other

chapters he analyses the sins of the individual in modern society in images which make the reader start with horror. This " four-dimensional thriller," as it has been called, deserves to be recognized as among the most virulent moral invective of our generation.

It is naturally to the moralists that we turn to take away the sickly taste of this fiction, to Mr William Faulkner, preaching his wild bitter sermons in the America that lost the Civil War, and even to the violence of Mr T. F. Powys, sour and exaggerated as this may be at times. Mr Powys, indeed, seems to be the bad conscience of our time writ large. Despite the extremes to which he allows his loathing of mankind to go, we feel that Mr Powys is not criticizing other people's sins but rooting out the evil in our own hearts and showing it magnified with horror. No one since the author of *The Revenger's Tragedy* (with whom both Mr Powys and Mr Faulkner have something in common) has hated his fellow-men more. In some of the earlier novels, especially *Mr Tasker's Gods*, not only are the characters almost entirely horrible misshapen creatures, monsters of cruelty, lust and greed, but even the farms seem to stock only the most bestial pigs and the fiercest of bulls, the fields to be populated with owls, rats, and stoats, weasels, foxes and bats, and the lanes to grow only nettles, docks and the most prickly and least fruitful of brambles. The scene is supposed to be Wessex, but it is really a nightmare region of the mind halfway between Bedlam and Hell. Yet, Mr Powys is not cursing and blaspheming at the face of fate, but lamenting the evil that is man, and, though some of his earlier snarls may give rise to a grin, they are nearly always salutary.

Mr Faulkner is a novelist of much greater imaginative power and scope than Mr Powys, though he may not be so polished an artist. In *Sanctuary*, he howls his disgust at certain aspects of industrial America, and concentrates his hatred upon a painted little fool of a college girl, who is to be regarded as a product of Hollywood and co-educational mass-production, and pursues her to the end which she deserves with a viciousness besides which Mr Powys' treatment of his characters is as gentle as that of a new-born babe. It was for this novel that he was described by Mr Wyndham Lewis in *Men without Art* as " a novelist with a corn-cob "—Mr Faulkner's strength is shown by the fact that he survived that famous " de-bunking." In *Light in*

August, he preaches and rails in a wild confused manner, rather like his own character Hornblower, the parson in whose sermons galloping horses are continually getting involved with the gospels. Hornblower, in fact, is typical of the character which is to be found in various manifestations in most novels of Mr Faulkner's (Joe in *Soldier's Pay*, the journalist in *Pylon*, the doctor in *The Wild Palms*), a character who may be described as " the man who gets mixed up in things "; a character who neither directs the action of the novel nor affects greatly the lives of the other characters, who is often bewildered, even stupid, but always in the middle of things. This character seems to have much in common with Mr Faulkner's conception of his function as a novelist, though he is very far from stupid. In his latest novels, especially in *Pylon* and *Absalom! Absalom!* Mr Faulkner no longer preaches. *Absalom! Absalom!* is a back-to-front study of a murder, a sort of Freudian detective story, and *Pylon* an account of two men and one woman living together in an air circus. At first it may seem that Mr Faulkner has placed his characters in a world into which the question of morals does not arise, but this is not so. The morality is there all right, but so also is a new humility—Mr Faulkner does not presume to judge.

There are quieter satirists, too, who prick the bubbles more gently but no less effectively. If a character from a novel by Mr Morgan or Mr Aldington were to walk into the pages of Mr E. M. Forster, he would soon feel uncomfortable and look not a little ridiculous. Miss Elizabeth Bowen also possesses an intellect in the light of which the pretensions of the characters of the type of fiction we have just condemned shrivel up like raisins.

These novelists have helped to clear the air of the spume of emotion thrown up by the soda-fountain, and now there is growing up a new generation of novelists (among whom ought to be counted Miss Bowen) who are as much awake to social problems as were the pre-war group, and are not likely to fall into the mistakes of materialism on the one hand, or of bogus emotionalism on the other. Among these may be mentioned here Mr Graham Greene and Mr James Hanley. Mr Greene is, I believe, a Roman Catholic, and certainly his characters, for all their wickedness and violence (as in *Brighton Rock*), have at the core of their consciousness a sense that sin is something different from just not doing the right thing. Mr Hanley is the greatest

of our younger realist novelists. No one knows better than he does the social conditions in our seaports, and the pressure which is brought to bear on the individual by economic and other circumstances, yet he never shifts the moral obligation from the individual to the society.

In Mr Hanley's latest book, *Our Time is Gone*, a story of the effects of the war of 1914-18 on the lives of the Furies (the Irish-Catholic family about whom he has written two other novels, *The Furies* and *The Secret Journey*), the characters stand out solid and real, like cores of concentrated suffering within the hard rind of the life of the northern seaport where most of the action takes place. Indeed, into the mouth of Slye Esquire, an abortionist's tout and seller of indecent postcards and crude religious pictures, are put words which show the morality of the soda-fountain without the fizz to distract the beholder: " In this world the best way to live and get on is to look at everything and call it good. Yes. Even if it's bad, call it good ! Look at me ! I've always followed that method and I've never gone wrong, and another thing, Maury, imagination. Now if you've got imagination, well, you can get anywhere."

Slye Esquire's words apply as well to the writers of popular fiction as to the middlemen in the abortionist trade.

Norman Nicholson.

Some Implications of the Fall of Constantinople

For some years now the writer has lived in the city that was once imperial Constantinople. Through increasingly intimate contact with the historic centre of Orthodoxy, friends among its clergy, daily sight of the noble ruined walls of the city, visits to the Church of the Holy Wisdom and other ruined shrines, what has been the main impression ? Fundamentally the implicit challenge of a permanent element of Byzantium to the humdrum banality of the West; a challenge which reveals the tragic contrast of greatness, splendour, dignity and nobility so closely linked with baseness, squalor and decadence. In all soberness, one can say that human nature has never soared higher than

here, no human conception of imperial majesty has ever reached that of the Byzantine emperors, while no eclipse has been more absolute in this city of unrivalled beauty and tragic ruin.

For civilized humanity the fall of the city was the end of a great period, a nodal point of change. It has rightly taken its place with the fall of Troy, the destruction of Jerusalem, the sack of Rome. The epic theme still awaits its great poet. In the long twisted strands of the human story, strands that come out from the far past, here a gathering together and a great knot was made.

In the ancient world of Christian and immediately pre-Christian times, one unassailable fact always stood out: the permanence of the Roman Empire. That even ultimately the hordes of the outer darkness should overwhelm it was unthinkable. When Rome herself fell, this impregnability attached itself to her rival Constantinople. The effect of the Fall is to be assessed by the might of the shock given to this belief, so deeply and for such long ages imbedded in the Byzantine mind, and reflected more palely by the adjacent medieval world.

That Fall, we realize, took place when neither the city could reach a lower state of weakness nor the Empire be further diminished, when the Church of the East was divided and confused by the false Ferrara-Florence reunion with Rome, and when the ecclesiastical throne was widowed. But typically, symbolically, both Empire and Church retained their potential integrity to the end. To the last the *triclinia* were spread and the places reserved at the Emperor's side for the great nobles who ruled the imperial themes, places indeed unoccupied and provinces in the hands of the enemy, to the end the Empire was co-terminous with God's rule on earth. And because of her symbolic integrity the Orthodox Church survived and even gained strength through the cataclysm. The independence which she could never have gained had the West come effectually to her aid was granted her in sufficient measure under Turkish rule. Indeed it was mainly because the Byzantines hoped for this very thing, being in such a situation that hope from any side was very slight, that the city fell. There was no longer a united desire among them that it should continue to stand. Constantinople, from the point of view of military strategy was reduced by a blockade of the Bosphorus, which cut off her supplies from the Black Sea,

and by the first successful bombardment by heavy cannon in history; but ultimately she fell in the spiritual sphere, through the despair of her own children. The evil results of non-Christian domination, which persist mournfully to this very day, were undoubted, but it must be remembered that under Turkish rule the Patriarchs of Constantinople gained a definite religious and civil jurisdiction even over their old rivals of Antioch and Alexandria. Such a supremacy in Latin hands would have almost inevitably become a papacy. The parallel between the destruction and decline of imperial Rome is close enough to warrant us saying that; but the mind of Orthodoxy has always abhorred the conception of a centralized autocracy for the Church, and in her long chequered history she has time and again preferred to face poverty, diminution and a going out into the unknown, to that alternative.

We must, however, note a centrally important fact: after the Fall the Orthodox Church is both banished and herself effects a withdrawal from the ecclesiastical scene of Europe. She retires behind the thick mist of the dreaded empire of the Grand Turk and the unknown fastnesses of the star world. Not that this isolation was effected at one stroke. The process of orientalizing which set in after the failure of Justinian in the sixth century to reconstitute the ancient Roman Empire of the Mediterranean seaboard and make it Catholic and Orthodox was later definitely encouraged by the anti-Hellenic almost semitic movement of the Iconoclast. It hardened into the emergence of a homogeneous Orthodox Church, and when shorn of Italy and North Africa on the one side, of Egypt and Syria on the other, to say nothing of far-off Armenia and Persia, she gained in consistency what she lost in extension. Theologically and ecclesiastically we can regard Chalcedon as the great watershed in this process, the success of the Arab invasions as another, the Great Schism as yet another, while the Fall put a seal on them all.

It is still, one believes, recorded in most school history books that the Renascence of Learning in Europe must be directly attributed to the Fall of Constantinople. As a generalization this is difficult to verify, while its implications are pernicious. The Italian Renascence began at least a century before. The period 1340-1540 covers a movement in Italy, mainly centred in Florence, so brilliant, so permeated with genius that it can be compared only with

the brief flowering of fifth-century Athens or the Augustan age. But actually Byzantium and the Renascence belong to different worlds, and only intersect fortuitously. However encouraged by exiles from Constantinople after 1453, the Renascence as a movement was indigenous to Italy, rising on a soil still encumbered with the ruins of the ancient world. Moreover, the Renascence was rediscovering in a rather uncritical and ecstatic way what Byzantium with its Roman, Hellenistic and Greek heritage had long since assimilated, but, and this is surely crucial, *only after a process of exorcizing*. Byzantium knew paganism far too well to want to revive it. Her humanism was of another character altogether. It is necessary to remember in this connexion the great classical revival in letters in the East of the fourth century, when the Schools of Athens and Alexandria still survived, the splendid and triumphant expansion (as Paganism waned) of the period of Justinian, and the later brilliance of the Iconoclast emperors. The Renascence, whether Italian or German, can have had little direct interest for the Orthodox Byzantine world, as correspondingly the cultural and religious spirit of Byzantine life was a fast-closing book to western Europe.

Yet the Orthodox world had then, as she still has, an inestimably rich and living gift in her keeping. Had Europe been able to assimilate it at the very period of her new religious ferment in the later fifteenth century, it might indeed have changed the face of western religion. And that gift is not merely the power of communicating to the Christian world the theology of the patristic period, but what is essential to the understanding of the Fathers, the unity of life and liturgy of the Church in which they lived, the appropriate and living background and matrix of their teaching, without which that teaching has been almost inevitably barren or distorted. To simplify this contention, how can we understand the teaching of St Basil or St Chrysostom, unless we are familiar with the living rites which bear their names? The Orthodox Liturgy is the life-bearing channel that leads straight through to the Fathers, from the Fathers to the Apostolic and scriptural witness and brings us to the Way, the Truth and the Light Himself. Herein lies pre-eminently the direct and living but not always or necessarily consciously formulated contact with the groups of Christian belief. It belongs of right to the humblest Orthodox worshipper. How far does it belong

to us in the West? There has been in Roman Catholic circles a revival of interest in the Byzantine and other oriental rites. While it would not be fair to call this "en amateur," it remains that apart from a general consistency and integrity of Orthodox belief, and particularly of Orthodox eucharistic belief, the inner secret must be lost or distorted. We are familiar with the staging of Oriental liturgies at Eucharistic Congresses, but it is difficult to understand in what frame of mind a Scholastic can celebrate the Mysteries according to the rite of St Chrysostom or St Basil, nor can it be for the laity who assist much more than an exotic spectacle, an instance of the pernicious "artistic" appeal of the apparently bizarre in Oriental religion. The Uniat Churches share in this problem, and rather expose the gulf that divides East and West than vindicate a Catholicity.

We are faced, then, with the phenomenon of an almost complete isolation of Orthodoxy from the western world, beginning indeed even before the Great Schism, and very conspicuously, before the Fall of the Empire. According to all rules of precedent there ought to have been a great revival of the influence of Orthodoxy, a veritable renascence, when the city fell. The elements of a fruitful new spring were all there. But apparently nothing happened: nothing, at any rate, commensurate with the extent and importance of the disaster. And this does not apply only to the ecclesiastical sphere. The great cultural advances of human civilization, the new high-water marks, arise out of destruction, never quite complete, of an older framework, by a new and more vigorous and lively conquering force. Thus the Cretan civilization over a wide area of the Mediterranean basin fell before the Achæans the fruitful heroic Mycenæan age took its place. So in turn the Mycenæan age fell in ruins before the Doric invasions, and the supreme miracle of classical Greece sweeps up in a proud and splendid curve to the highest point yet known to us. The Macedonian conquests of Alexander and the disintegration of his Empire lead to the almost world-wide expansion of Hellenism, while the impact of the Hellenistic world on Rome gave the world the long golden afternoon of the Antonines. Later still, the impact of the barbarians on Italy led through the tunnel of the Dark Ages to the medieval civilization of Europe.

These two phenomena of the isolation of Orthodoxy and the barrenness of influence of the East may, however, be

considered from at least two points of view that afford light on the problem raised. The first is that the isolation of the Orthodox Church for some four hundred years, in the light of subsequent events, can only be called providential. Latinism and Protestantism may be legitimately regarded as the obverse sides of the same die. Their developments from the sixteenth century to to-day are interdependent and reactionary. Orthodoxy through her isolation has been held apart from the Reformation, the counter-Reformation, eighteenth-century humanism, and the revivals of this past hundred years. She confronts and challenges us, conserving her original and primitive type. As she comes out of her isolation, she presents to us, outside her borders, the spectacle of a Church, who speaks in the accents of a living patristic faith and practice. If we can appreciate the implications of that supremely important fact, our work for an ecumenical reintegration of the Church must take a new orientation. And secondly, the conditions of the Fall of Constantinople were such that the looked-for revival and refructification of civilization through the Byzantine Empire proved impossible. The gap between Byzantine civilization and that of her conquerors on the one hand, and of medieval Europe on the other, was too wide to be successfully bridged. The Turkish Empire of the Sultans continued in an extremely orientalized form, the shadow of the Empire of the Romans right down to the Treaty of Lausanne. What could be copied was copied, what could be assimilated was assimilated, but the outcome was painfully barren of results. The soil was too poor to produce the harvest. What might have taken place, had the Greek element in Anatolia remained is now only a dream. Nor can we overlook the fact that the rise to independence of Greece, her wonderful renascence in the period that followed Byronic times, was ultimately fatal to the influence of Phanarist power. These matters are too living to bear dissection and must be left to the quicker mind of the future historian. The results of the Fall of Constantinople, we believe, are for the time to come, and in their complexity they are preparing the pattern of the ecclesiastical world of the future. Some indication of that influence and preparation can, however, be seen in the extent to which the results of the modern cataclysm of Orthodox Russia is influencing the non-Orthodox thought and life to-day. The reactions on Anglican thought of Bulgakoff, Florovsky and Berdyaev are doing more than anything to open our eyes to

the depth of the wound the Church suffered when the last Emperor of the Romans went out to his heroic death through the great breach of the Walls of Constantinople.

Austin Oakley.

"Flesh and Blood hath not revealed it unto thee"

In contemporary theological debate we are the witnesses of a renewed concentration upon essentials. We are no longer, as it were, preoccupied by issues which lie at the circumference of the circle of faith. We are at the centre, and our attention is concentrated on the elementary simplicities of the relation of God and man.

Here, perhaps more than in any other respect, one can see the truly prophetic quality wherewith one must invest the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' insistence on the relativity of theological debate to the question, "What is the nature of the Gospel?" More perhaps than any other *English* theologian of his generation he saw the issues underlying all debates concerning ministry and sacrament, and pointed clearly the terms into which we must translate them before we might hope to resolve them. The very harshness of his writing was prescribed by his insight into the "creative and unmanageable" material of the New Testament. If we, who have long flirted with Christian Platonism, Incarnationalism, the "logic of the sacramental idea," and similar theological *Ersatz*, are at last being forced back on the Word of revelation, we must, in common humility, pay tribute to a master whose warnings we were often loath to heed.

"We are concerned with the nature of the Gospel." So Hoskyns, not once, but many times, and in many places. What do we mean by the word "Gospel"? Pose the question thus verbalistically, and at once one suggests the method of lexicographical analysis pursued in Kittel's *Wörterbuch*. Every child, however, can begin to give the answer—"gospel" means "good news." Yes, but news presupposes a messenger, and one to whom the message is given. There is of course the further question of the character of the

message. If it is desired to formulate the point exactly, one can say that the background of the notion of news is supplied by a triadic relation obtaining between the messenger, the message, and those to whom the message is brought.

Now if we look at the problems in theology that mostly torment us, we can, I think, see that they concern the analysis of the terms in question. The messenger, the message, the recipients of the message. I am not suggesting for a moment that any of the terms can be viewed in isolation from the other two, nor that one can hope to assess any of them apart from their reaction one to another in the concrete situation, which we may describe as the delivery of the message. Moreover, it is perhaps the final insight of New Testament theology that in this situation the messenger himself is his own message. But in this study I am concerned primarily with the recipients. (My first task indeed is to offer some comment on the issues raised by Dr Emil Brunner's book, *Man in Revolt*,[1] which bears the sub-title of "A Christian Anthropology.") We are concerned with man, and with man as what we may call the Gospel-situation reveals him. Our attention is therefore primarily on the recipient of the message and on the mode in which he received it.

Hoskyns called the New Testament a terrible book, and assuredly he was right to do so. It is terrible as embodying such episodes as the flight of the disciples, the choice of Bar-abbas, the isolation and dereliction of Jesus. The concrete evangelical situation, in which the message is, so to speak, delivered at the cost of its rejection, entails an appalling comment on the character of the recipients. We are so familiar with the crucifix as a religious symbol that we forget its paradox. It adorns our churches, and therefore it has assumed a certain respectability. We forget that, when we speak of the crucifixion as God's revelation, we are speaking of a criminal's death as the occasion of His self-disclosure. It is as horrible as that. We may romanticize the episode, if we like, by using such words as writers in the Sunday papers delight to employ when they speak of the "drama of redemption." But we have got to give cash-value to our terms. Hangman's gibbet—that is what the Cross means, in one quite legitimate sense of the term "mean."

[1] English translation by Olive Wyon. The Lutterworth Press. 15s.

Perhaps by more almost than anything, our recovery of the Christian faith is menaced by our romanticization of its dogma. In some way we translate it into terms that empty its content of its challenge to our self-sufficiency. We have lost, and find very hard to regain, our sense of its givenness. We do not realize that it demands that we translate all our questions into its terms. There are human questionings to which it is indeed an answer, but only when first they have been shown in their true light by its impact upon them.

What is man? That presumably is the question we would hope to find discussed in a Christian anthropology. In the language of the Gospel we might reframe it, To whom did Jesus come? and then inevitably our answer would be, To His own, who did not receive Him. Thus man is that unto which Jesus came, for in a peculiar sense he is the possession of the Divine word, but (we cannot underestimate the force of that adversative) "His own received Him not." At first tentatively the dignity of man is affirmed, and here surely there is direct continuity between the Logos prologue and the Synoptics. There is a coming, and an encounter between the Son of God and His people. The tension is explicit from the first, but at least in the fact of the coming of Messiah there is surely an affirmation of the character of those to whom He came. They are His own.

But—the rest we know, even though we shrink from its stark terror. Yet it is through the very situation that his wickedness creates that man is redeemed. His *culpa* is *felix*. With that, however, we are not concerned, rather simply with the analysis of the sentence, "He came unto His own, and His own received Him not." In that sentence is, as it were, epitomized the first part of any proper Christian anthropology. There is a later part concerning itself with the consequences of the rejection or, if you prefer it, with the very means of grace. Our concern is with nature.

The anthropological debate is of course the familiar "grace and nature" debate recast and made more intimate to our half-trained theological perception. One might also define its reference by the question, To whom is the Gospel brought? That is of course a question to which in the first instance a direct historical answer can be given. One can describe the political and economic set-up in first-century Jewry. But that is not a theological answer, or, if it is preferred, the kind of answer that the Gospel gives. If we are to understand that answer, we must, I am sure,

learn a greater elasticity in respect of our comprehension of the relation of universals and particulars. Of that more later.

In his article in the December THEOLOGY, Fr Mascall accused the Rev. Noel Davey of regarding grace "rather as annihilating than as healing and perfecting nature." Now I do not profess fully to understand Mr Davey's valuable, but exceedingly difficult, article on biblical theology to which Fr Mascall refers. One does well, I think, however, to suspect a tendency among some Catholics to belittle the reality of the *vulnera* of original sin (on this *cf.* the valuable letter of Fr Victor White, O.P. in THEOLOGY for April, 1940) and underestimate the work that *gratia sanans* has to do. But where Davey, following here the late Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, seems emphatically right is in his emphasis on the theological understanding of the biblical history. The recognition that Christianity has its roots in history is as old as the formal celebration of the divine liturgy. But there has been a tendency among Catholics to pay knee-service to the fact by genuflecting at the Incarnatus, and to forget its immense theological significance. Our whole scheme of the relations of God and man has been set out ontologically, and the eschatological reference of grace left out of account.

We have ignored in our appreciation of the Christian faith its historical character. Certainly the Nicene creed has embodied a number of directly historical propositions, whose factual truth we have been rightly concerned to defend. But we have lost consciousness of the sense of historical crisis that pervades the Gospel story, and is, if we are to take the theology of the fourth Evangelist seriously, a constant factor in the impact of the Flesh of Christ upon successive generations of men and women. Our anthropological schemes have, in effect, been constructed with little or no direct recollection of man as the impact of the Word of God reveals him.

It is here that I discern the primary importance of Brunner's book. Historically the line of development from Kant's criticism of ontological metaphysics to Buber's *Ich und du* philosophy can be traced by the student. (Incidentally this work affords valuable data to the student of the precise relation of the Kantian Critique to the contemporary Protestant theological situation.) One can even say that Buber has taken Aristotle's place in Brunner's natural-theological anthropology. But one has not, I think, touched the nerve of the question at issue. When one says that, for rational as the differentia of the human animal, Brunner has

followed Kant in substituting morally responsible, one has not progressed very much in the appreciation of his insights. Only when one has seen that the question Brunner is really asking is, Who hears the Gospel?—or if you like, What kind of animal must a Gospel-hearer be?—can one hope to appreciate the paradoxes of his anthropology.

Brunner starts with man as the theological situation of the New Testament reveals him. He wants to answer the question, What does "His own" mean? Clearly it refers in the first instance to a term in a relational situation, not the term of primary importance, but a term that must be present to constitute the situation. (Students of English form critics will be familiar with the phrase "central figure" in discussion of the Gospels. It is suggestive of their emphasis.) It denotes those who are brought face to face with the eschatological crisis of Messiah's coming by reference to that characteristic in virtue of their possession of which they are compelled to face him. And that characteristic is *capacity of decision.*

Yes, but what does that mean? Decision upon evidence as is involved in the assent to any empirical factual proposition? Or—what? Of course we realize that more than a mere intellectual assent is involved. But what evokes the capacity of assent in the first instance? It is only when we have posed the question in these terms that the devastating paradox of the verse I have used as a title smites us.

Hoskyns' brilliant but disturbing sermon on this text first forced it on my attention.[1] There he points out that *caro et sanguis*, *σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα*, are all translations, which ultimately run back to the Hebrew or Aramaic phrase "Basar we dam."

"The phrase 'flesh and blood,'" he goes on, "in Hebrew and Aramaic (*i.e.*, the spoken language of Palestine in the first century) meant a man, or men, and very particularly men in distinction from God; men, their thoughts and actions as distinguished from the thoughts and actions of God. The phrase defines human, analysable opinions and experiences, and human visible and analysable behaviour as finite and temporal, as relative as opposed to the infinite and eternal truth and righteousness of God. The phrase is therefore far more all-embracing than what is normally denoted by the two words 'flesh and blood.'"

[1] *Cambridge Sermons*, pp. 137 *ff.*

Thus the revelation that Jesus is the Messiah is given to Simon Bar-Jonah not in virtue of human ratiocination but as a gift of God. Not "flesh and blood" but "my Father which is in heaven." Before Simon stands a man like unto himself (a leader, maybe, but between leadership and Messianic dignity there is a great gulf fixed). For if the latter is attributable to the man before him, then it is in the very crisis of human history that he is involved. He is faced with the choice that is irrevocable, ultimate, final. For in Jesus the end, finality, that beyond which there is nothing at all, fronts him.

He has the capacity of response, which in the Lucan birth-story the Mother of Jesus is presented to us as having. He can say Yea or Nay. But—the response is evoked by—the Father which is in Heaven. Brunner has been rebuked in respect of his anthropological analysis for attempting to rest at a non-existent halfway house between Aquinas and Barth, with his ruthless *Nein*.[1] But is he not doing more than leaving the "form without the content"? Is he not attempting to exhibit the anthropological situation as the Gospel reveals it? What does the Gospel say of man in his eschatological situation—that is, face to face with the ultimate exposed in Jesus—than that he can respond?

The issue is of absolutely first-order importance. Much of Brunner's book is remarkably congruous with the writings of such Catholics as Maritain and Demant. Man in the grace of God is man endowed again with the capacity for ordering and integrating the complex propensities of his natural life. But what of "natural" man? How is Brunner's exegesis reconcilable with the orthodox Catholic appreciation of his capacities? Or if you like, Is the latter reconcilable with the tremendous tension of the biblical theology? These questions I hope to take up on a future occasion.[2]

D. M. Mackinnon.

[1] *Cf.* J. Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God*, chapter i.
[2] In a further article entitled, "Revelation and History."

The Church in Politics after the War

DURING the period of reconstruction which must follow the present hostilities, the Church will be called to play a vital part. She must not fail: it is imperative that the state of drift which characterized our religious as well as our political life during the decade preceding this war should not recur. Humanly speaking, it is certain that our military and economic forces will win the war; let us see to it that our spiritual forces do not lose the peace. The whole Church, laity and clergy, must now commence to envisage her task in the time when the way shall once more be open to creative and progressive activity in all spheres of our common life.

One of the most difficult and important problems will be an essential clarification of the Church's attitude towards social and economic matters. Anglican orthodoxy holds, with good reason, that to identify the social teaching of the Church with the program of any particular party would be to be untrue to her nature and function. But in the endeavour to preserve this nature unsullied from the world of politics, the Church has considered it necessary to confine her pronouncements on social and economic problems to various vague and formless declarations made by the Church Assembly, the Lambeth Conference or by isolated divines. Their general tenor is to the effect that justice and morality must prevail in the relations between nation and nation, between employer and employee, between class and class. The insufficiency of such terms as these has long been manifest. This age demands, and will demand, concrete and finite proposals as a prerequisite of action. It is clear that a *via media* must be found between the construction of a party program and the pronouncement of aspirations which remain only aspirations.

In a recent book by a leading historian of political thought[1] the main social doctrines of modern Europe are enunciated as Representative Democracy, Catholicism, Communism, Fascism and National Socialism. The Catholic doctrine, says the writer, is " a doctrine in terms of natural law." It is a major misfortune that the Roman Church should have acquired a virtual monopoly of this conception. Held as it was by a great cloud of patristic and medieval witnesses,

[1] *Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe*, by M. Oakeshott.

it may well prove the rock on which Christian political action will find a solid foundation in the future.

What has a survival such as this to do with the Europe, more especially with the England, of to-day? The chief value of the idea of Natural Law lies in its timelessness. The conception that there are laws which the very nature of God makes inherent in the human society, which is His creation, bears the marks of eternal truth. It is the approximation of positive law to these laws of God which the Church must encompass. Which are they? I will quote as fervid an opponent of Roman Catholicism as may be found—the liberal thinker T. H. Green—in order to show that in adopting its social doctrine, no concession is made to that absolutism which renders the ecclesiastical side of Roman Catholicism so abhorrent to many English Churchmen and non-Churchmen. "We hold that those actions or omissions should be made obligations which, when made obligations, serve a certain moral end," and again: "those acts . . . of which the performance or omission, irrespectively of the motive from which it proceeds, is so necessary to the existence of a society in which the moral end stated can be realized, that it is better for them to be done or omitted from that unworthy motive which consists in fear or hope of the legal consequences than not to be done at all." The moral end of politics as stated by the Christian Church can be briefly summarized as the full development of personality in a corporate life dedicated to the service of God. What conditions are necessary to a society in which this end may be achieved?

The first condition is an economic one: men must not be so weighed down by material distress, so preoccupied with material cares (not necessarily selfish ones), that their spiritual powers and perceptions become atrophied. How is this to be attained? The principle of Natural Law teaching on this point is set out by Professor Tawney in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (chapter 1): "The most fundamental difference between medieval and modern economic thought consists of the fact that, whereas the latter normally refers to economic expediency . . . for the justification of any particular action, policy or system of organization, the former starts from the position that there is a moral authority to which considerations of economic expediency must be subordinated." Medieval publicists, under the influence of this doctrine, began by laying the

greatest emphasis upon the conception of the just price. We are now at war; and maximum prices for various commodities have not only been arrived at, but enforced. If maximum prices can be fixed in time of war, the Church can, in time of peace, commission her own experts to determine just prices. There is no lack of economic, nor indeed of any kind of technical, knowledge within the Church.

Regulation of wages is a second essential feature of Natural Law economics. In the Middle Ages it took (as with the feudal attitude it was bound to take) the form of limitation of wages, rather than that of the enforcement of a minimum wage. Although in the political sphere the advent of Trade Unions has facilitated the latter measure, the Church would in no way be exempt from drawing her own conclusions on the subject, should the commission envisaged above be set up.

As the revelation of the nature of God in the Bible is progressive, so is the revelation of His laws in society. The medieval writers were content with a just price and what they considered a fair wage. To-day there are further conditions which a corporate Christian conscience must see fulfilled, if the authority of moral order over economic expediency is to be fully realized. There exist among the abuses of modern economic life various skilful evasions of the Acts governing hours and conditions of labour in both shops and factories. These issues represent in positive law those tenets of natural law which demand for the full development of personality under God leisure for recreation and the greatest amount of pride in work compatible with the work done.

If Natural Law requires just and decent conditions of labour, how much more does it insist that men and women should not be so housed as to be forced to forget that their bodies are the temples of the Holy Spirit? For, if the man must, to fulfil his end, have some conception of the dignity of labour in the factory or the shop, what of the woman in the house? The evacuation of children from crowded areas has been a sharp lesson both to idealists and to realists: it is now evident that those faults of training which have been manifest were what was to be expected in homes where there was no inducement to preserve the decencies, where even a sixteen- or seventeen-hour day on the part of the woman could not keep pace with the demands made on her.

There is another matter which falls at least partly within

the economic sphere, though belonging more naturally to the cultural. The war has been made the excuse for an indefinite postponement of the Act raising the school-leaving age. Now both Natural Law and Representative Democracy require that that side of a personality which is concerned with ideas and ideals should have a reasonable chance to develop. It is the boast of democracy that under the democratic system all have a voice: it is the unequivocal demand of Natural Law that the voice be an educated voice. Educationalists and not economists are the proper judges of the age at which the human being is to take the place in society for which he or she is destined. The Church can provide these educationalists, who would be more unprejudiced than the industrialists to whose advantage an unlimited flow of juvenile labour inevitably accrues, and whose interests are so powerfully represented in the legislature.

It is on such questions as these that the Church should take a firm stand: for they are vital to the establishment of conditions which will enable men in society to pursue unhindered that society's moral end. They are not issues of party strife, but the minimum requisites of social justice. Deliberate and well-documented pronouncements upon them would remove for ever the cankering suspicion that the Church remains a sinister interest, a retarder of progress and a bulwark of reaction. The two great Encyclicals the *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII (1891) and the *Quadragesimo Anno* of Pius XI (1931) stand before us as reminders of what ecclesiastical pronouncements on politics may be. Not only do they present a coherent social doctrine, but two constitutions in Europe are based on their teaching—those of Eire and of Portugal—and a third also, until it was overturned by force.

But in England we have no infallible pontiff and no written constitution. How then, granted that the Church once adopts Natural Law as her political philosophy, is she to enforce her own political judgments on a secular government? It must be admitted from the outset that of enforcement in the literal sense there can be no question. In England the procedure might be somewhat as follows:

The permanent commission of experts suggested above would, from time to time, make such recommendations to the Archbishop of Canterbury as a particular situation in their sphere seemed to necessitate. These would then

be embodied in a letter written in the name of the Archbishops' Commission of Economic (or Educational, or Housing) Affairs, and published in full in the Press, in parish magazines and in all Church publications. It would thus be brought home to the community that the Church was fully conversant with the facts of the particular situation and had consecutive proposals to make concerning it.

While dealing with the problem of what is now comprehended in the term "propaganda," there is a further possibility which should in no wise be neglected. The Vatican publishes daily a well-informed and objective newspaper, the *Osservatore Romano*. Is it too much to hope that the Anglican Church, with the immense resources both of wealth and talent which it undoubtedly possesses, will not be shy of taking a leaf from the Roman book? There will be room after the war for another newspaper, so discontented has public opinion grown with the press of recent months. The political education of Christians is shamefully neglected: "non-political" has grown to be a term of approval in many quarters. The expression of the Church's views through a medium open to all would help to educate a new generation in a tradition of Christian citizenship and Christian polity. "Christendom" would regain its former meaning.

The second half of the task presents greater difficulties. The only accredited representatives of the Church in Parliament sit in that House which is not directly occupied with the initiation of legislation. But that is not to say that they are entirely powerless. It is a common accusation against the eighteenth-century episcopate that their preferment was more often due to political services rendered in the shape of speeches and pamphlets than to any outstanding pastoral qualifications. Although this charge has been greatly exaggerated[1] there is no doubt that the utterances of Church dignitaries carried great weight in that epoch, and they are listened to with respect, if not always with sympathy, even in widely secularized modern England. Counter-proposals are always possible in the discussion of a Bill in the Lords and if put forward by a united episcopal front would make a deep impression. The actual introduction of Bills would have to be left to the Christian laity

[1] See N. Sykes, *Church and State in the Eighteenth Century*, *passim*.

in the lower House: and indeed such a course of action as I have indicated would establish a valuable tradition of co-operation between clergy and laity in the political sphere—a tradition which has been a heart-felt want in days when, to secure those minimum demands necessary to the existence of the society we have postulated, political action has become imperative.

It may seem that in these details I have digressed from the original thesis of a return to Natural Law; this is not the case. The constitutional traditions of England are institutions to be handled with extreme care. Such a scheme as I have outlined would enable the Church to steer her *via media* between the Scylla of Erastianism and the Charybdis of Ultramontanism. She would have formed her own political philosophy, as becomes a free Church in a free State: this philosophy would impel her from time to time to form the conclusion that "certain actions or omissions should be made obligations." She would then proceed to pursue the fulfilment of these conditions without doing violence either to the dictates of her own nature or to the traditional constitutional methods of the country. She would knit her own members closer in the knowledge that they had a political as well as a theological tradition in common: and she would win the respect of all, and the allegiance of many, who to-day regard her as afraid or unwilling to face the challenge of what might well be called the most politically minded of all ages.

* * * * *

The Christian News-Letter has borne witness since its inception to the demand for a Christian commentary on current events and a forum for the discussion of their spiritual significance. Perhaps out of this venture may one day be be born such a publication as I envisage above, more widely and more immediately accessible to the general public.

JOHN MONTAGUE.

The Ethics of Tyrannicide

It has been said that the best form of government is autocracy tempered by assassination. The saying has just enough truth to be plausible.

The history of dictatorship shows that it tends to run an almost normal course. It has often happened that a nation bewildered and depressed by defeat has produced a leader of exceptional power, whose ideals for its regeneration are proclaimed with fiery eloquence and win general acceptance. For a time he succeeds beyond expectation, he is hailed as the saviour of his country, unifying a distracted people, recovering them to self-respect, rehabilitating their fortunes. Then, as Lord Rosebery said of Napoleon, "the lean hungry conqueror swells into the sovereign, and into the sovereign of sovereigns. Then comes the catastrophe. He loses the balance of his judgment, and becomes a curse to his country and to all others. He cannot be still himself, or give mankind an instant of repose. His neighbours' landmarks become playthings to him, he cannot leave them alone, he manipulates them for the mere love of moving them. There follows the inevitable collapse." And Lord Rosebery concludes: "The truth we take to be this. The mind of man has not in it sufficient ballast to enable it to exercise, or endure for long, supreme uncontrolled power. Or, to put it in other words, the human frame is unequal to anything approaching omnipotence. All history from the Cæsars onward teaches us this. Strong as was the intellect of Napoleon it was no exception to the rule." And Napoleon was more fortunate than most dictators; at least he died in his bed, though on St Helena.

When the tide of success turns, when things begin to go wrong, distrust of the dictator inevitably suggests his forcible removal before he brings complete ruin upon his people. Yet he cannot be brought before the ordinary tribunals of justice. Is it, then, ever permissible for the private person to do summary justice upon him, to interpret the mind of a large part of the people and to assume the office of the executioner?

That is a question which is perhaps in a number of minds to-day. The state of the world challenges us to clear our thought on the morality of tyrannicide. We do well to ask ourselves what our own reaction would be to the news

that an oppressive dictator had died by the bullet or bomb of an assassin. Should we instinctively deplore the sin of murder, or should we instinctively rejoice that justice had been done, albeit irregularly, and that one who had doomed many to violent death had himself met it? In other words, should we distinguish tyrannicide from murder, condoning it as justifiable homicide?

Let it be assumed that the taking of human life is in certain conditions lawful, legally and morally. The clergy at any rate have assented to two propositions, that the laws of the realm may punish Christian men with death for heinous and grievous offences, which punishment necessitates the office of the executioner, and that it is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the magistrates, to wear weapons and serve in the wars. It is to be noted that the Latin text of Article XXXVII imports the consideration that the wars must be just, " arma portare et *justa* bella administrare."

The right of homicide in self-defence is also admitted by the moralists, if a man's life be imperilled, and if there be no other way of meeting or evading attack. It is in that case an act which has as its end the prevention of a crime. But the man who kills another in self-defence becomes responsible to the law; he is not judge in his own case, it is for the Courts to decide whether self-defence to the point of homicide was in the particular case fully justified.

These are the classes of justifiable homicide with which men are ordinarily concerned. But we are sometimes impelled to ask whether there may not be other cases in which the taking of life is morally justifiable. The concentration of immense power over life and death in the hands of one man who abuses it has often raised the question whether tyrannicide is invariably to be condemned, whether it be a sin to put an end to the innumerable crimes of an oppressive ruler. Public opinion has often inclined not merely to condone tyrannicide, as being the less of two evils, but to acclaim the assassin, who has at least risked his own life, as a national hero. In the cemetery at Serajevo lies Gavrilo Princep, whose bomb killed the Archduke Ferdinand. People come to burn candles there, as at a shrine, and it has been a place of pilgrimage for fifteen years.

It is not unnatural that a distinction should be drawn between murder, which is in the interest—supposed or real—of the individual, and tyrannicide which appears to be in the public interest. In Matthew Arnold's drama *Merope*

Polyphontes justifies his assassination of Chresphontes by insisting on this distinction:

> Murder ! but what *is* murder ? When a wretch
> For private gain or hatred takes a life
> We call it murder, crush him, brand his name.
> But when for some great public cause an arm
> Is, without love or hate, austerely raised
> Against a power exempt from common checks,
> Dangerous to all, to be but annulled—
> Ranks any man with murder such an act ?
> With grievous deeds, perhaps; with murder, No !

Public opinion is not disposed to censure Charlotte Corday, who rid France of the terrible Marat, the author of the Massacres of September, it regards the intention of the act rather than its abstract immorality, it applauds the courage of the beautiful girl who faced the certain consequences of her act and went smiling to her death, and it concludes that in such a case a great good may be gained at the cost of a relatively small evil.

Nor have moralists themselves spoken with one voice. The reasoned defence of tyrannicide has been advanced not only by Protestant writers, especially in the stormy sixteenth century, but also by some Catholic moralists. If Sexby in England wrote *Killing no Murder*, of which the argument was that it would be no crime to murder Cromwell, Carpentier de Marigny in France issued a tract entitled "To Kill a Tyrant is not a Crime," to justify in advance any attempt on the life of Cardinal Mazarin, Cromwell's strange ally. Yet it must be noted that even those who defended the right to put tyrants to death usually maintained the principle that their death must not be compassed by privately planned assassination, but must be inflicted in the name of the community and with some show of judicial or legislative procedure. Luther held that the whole community could put a tyrant to death. Junius Brutus, a Calvinist writer, held that the individual had no right to kill a tyrant, but that a council representative of the people had the right so to act. John Knox held that it was the duty of the nobility, judges, rulers and people of England to condemn Mary Stuart to death. The Puritan rulers of England were therefore acting in accordance with principles already widely accepted when they held a formal and public trial of King Charles, in their eyes a tyrant; even though

his fate was as clearly predetermined as that of the Abbot of Glastonbury, about whom an earlier Cromwell had penned the memorandum "Item. The Abbot of Glaston to be tried at Glaston and also executed there." The Puritan leaders had, in fact, some regard to the principle which underlies the moral teaching of Catholics about tyrannicide.

That principle is that it is never right for the individual intentionally to take life apart from the authorization of the community, the sanction of the law. That sanction justifies the action of the executioner, who is the minister of the punishment decreed by the community through its courts of justice. That sanction justifies the action of the soldier who serves in a just war in defence of the community and at its call. Participation in a duel in which the taking of life is probable has no such sanction from the community, and is therefore prohibited by the Christian code. Yet if a combat to the death were arranged, as of old, between individual warriors, representative champions of their armies, that would not come under the condemnation of the duel, since it would have the sanction of the community.

With the community, then, and not with the individual, rests the power over life and death, exercised through its courts of justice or courts-martial. The Christian code of ethics takes no account of pretended courts set up by revolutionary movements, which profess to try and condemn persons in their absence and with no opportunity of defence, and then command their agents to execute sentence of death. That is merely murder, by whatever other name a revolutionary committee may call it. Therefore the Irish Roman Catholic bishops have consistently denounced and excommunicated those who so act in the name of secret organizations, even when their sympathies were with the cause which the organizations professed to support.

Difficult cases may remain for decision even when the principle and its application are in general clear. For example, it may not always be certain where the power of the state may for the time being reside. A state may become divided against itself by rebellion, and the fortunes of civil war sway this way and that for a long time, so that it cannot be easily determined at what point revolution has become successful and the authority of the state has passed from the original government to the executive of the revolutionary movement. It was not easy to determine at what moment

the government of Spain had passed to Franco, so that under international law his authority could be recognized by other nations. In such cases, doubtless, the power over life and death might be taken to reside in the civil and military authority in effective control of a particular region, even though its area was not that of the entire country. The main principle remains unaffected, that neither the individual nor the small group can lawfully take life, even the life of a tyrant, without the sanction of the community judicially expressed.

The discussion of the point is not merely academic. We may not ourselves be tempted to tyrannicide, but we may, in thought, be partakers of other men's sins. If tyrannicide be not justifiable homicide, and is in fact nothing else than murder, any condonation or approval of the act is forbidden to us, even though the effect of the act be the ridding of the world of a ruthless oppressor.

E. Hermitage Day.

MISCELLANEA

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Steiner is Senior Science Master at Gordonstoun School, Morayshire.

Mr Nicholson is a W.E.A. lecturer; his article is based on a lecture given at a S.C.M. conference at Swanwick last year.

The Rev. Austin Oakley has been Chaplain to the British Embassy in Turkey since 1934.

Mr Mackinnon is a Fellow of Keble College, Oxford.

Mr Montague was Assistant Secretary of the S.C.M. in Cambridge last year.

Dr Hermitage Day was formerly Editor of the *Church Times*.

Dr Sykes is Professor of History in the University of London and Canon Theologian of Liverpool Cathedral.

The Rev. C. H. S. Runge is the Provincial of the Community of the Resurrection at Rosettenville, South Africa.

STUDIES IN TEXTS

I will restore to you the years that the locust hath eaten. Joel ii, 25.

Some time about 300 B.C. the little community of Jews centred in Jerusalem suffered a grevious calamity, in the shape of a plague of locusts. Such calamities were not uncommon; but this one was immortalized by the prophetic insight of Joel, who used it as the basis of his oracle in chapters i and ii (ch. iii is by a later hand). The fast proclaimed in ii, 15-17 is the classic example of a day of national humiliation; it is used for the Epistle on Ash Wednesday. And ii, 28-32 is the prototype of the Day of Pentecost.

Joel is at once prophet and apocalyptist, anticipating much that is found in the later apocalypses. The locusts herald " the day of the Lord " (i, 15). They are genuine insects, but they are also " the northern army " (ii, 20), breaking out from the eschatological quarter of calamity (see Jer. i, 14; Ezek. i, 4). They are described in military terms. The religious attitude towards them was that of submission and repentance.

In 1914-18 " the northern army " broke out in a wave of destruction. The War ended, certainly without any national repentance on the part of Britain. No true peace followed, only an armistice which has now ceased. Just at this point the prophecy becomes peculiarly apposite. " That which the palmer-worm hath left hath the locusts eaten; and that which the locust hath left hath the canker-worm eaten; and that which

the canker-worm hath left hath the caterpillar eaten" (i, 4). The words are taken to mean the locust at different stages of growth. Sometimes the locusts are driven away by the wind, or die on the ground, but not before first the females have laid their eggs. The first plague is succeeded by another, as the grubs newly hatched begin to devour vegetation and then to hop along the ground to new pastures.

So Europe to-day is suffering from the second crop of evil arising out of the first one, and the prophet's call to repentance sounds again. "God's judgment upon Europe" is indeed heavy. Few countries escaped the first War. Of them, Spain, Denmark and Norway have already been visited. Only Holland, Sweden and Switzerland remain at the time of writing.

But the promise of restoration remains. "I will restore to you the years that the locust hath eaten, the canker-worm, and the caterpillar, and the palmer-worm, my great army which I sent among you." Presently comes the outpouring of the Spirit, to which is attached the doctrine of "*the remnant*, those whom the Lord doth call"—a thought appropriate just now.

W. K. L. C.

COMMENT ON THEOLOGICAL PERIODICALS

War and the social problems which surround it are naturally prominent. The editorials of the *Modern Churchman*[1] (January and February) keep a good balance on the whole. But the praise of A. P. Herbert's gibe is too easy:

> "Battling Barbara who thought it would be good
> To stand against aggression—till we actually stood."

How far did we stand against aggression, and how far for some of our own interests? This question is begged. The *Expository Times*[2] (February) looks more away from the dedicated nation to the Civitas Dei. Generally one finds plenty of what one would expect to find—justification of both approximate justice and other-worldliness. It is all right as far as it goes, but in face of the less dedicated sides of our war policy we need a more searching diagnosis. The Rev. R. A. Edwards goes far to provide this in his article on "Perplexities of the Church in War-Time" (*Hibbert Journal*,[3] January). He clearly faces the awkward partnership of high ideals and sordid materialism. "The Archbishop of York's danger is that he should awake from his dream to be horrified by the company he has been

[1] Blackwell. 1s. monthly. [2] T. and T. Clark. 10d. monthly.
[3] Allen and Unwin. 2s. 6d. quarterly.

keeping." He praises pacifism from a non-pacifist view-point, and finally suggests that "people to-day watch the Church as they certainly did not watch it in 1914. Then everyone knew what it would do—to-day they are not sure." The *Hibbert Journal* has two other remarkable articles, touching the present situation. Professor De Burgh discusses "The Abuse of Knowledge," and admirers of his recent Giffords will not be disappointed. Science without moral purpose has led to all the evils of speed worship, mechanical boredom in work and totalitarian power. And no battle-cry of moral re-armament can be effective. "The religion that sets its trust in man can only be conquered by a religion which sets its trust in God." The treatment has a fresh and personal force. Professor Hearnshaw's "Miscarriage of Good Intentions" is a fierce attack on internationalists and pacifists who allowed the renewal of aggression between 1923 (Corfu incident) and 1939. It is a passionate and dangerous piece of special pleading. It assumes that the liberalism of the Weimar Republic was merely a "deceptive surface," and also that British pacifists were responsible for wrecking collective security. It claims to be realist, but entirely ignores the new horizontal lines of class conflict cutting across the old nationalist map.

A more constructive and Christian concern is shown by Mr A. C. F. Beales (*Clergy Review*,[1] March). After the war certain questions, such as the colonial, will be prominent. They should involve deep principle, but as things are now going "partisanship will be rife on all the wrong grounds." Mr Beales asks: "Can the teaching of the Church on the principles underlying international order be set out in a short, simple form available to the common people of the whole world?" Such teaching might produce a public opinion to back the already existing papal lead.

The second war number of *The Round Table*[2] deals with spiritual values in its first article on "The Issue." Stoic and New Testament beliefs in human equality form the intellectual bulwarks of democracy. The paper also prints a sermon preached by Dr Emil Brunner at Zurich last September. It is a remarkable, almost Laudian, blend of the other-worldly and an immediate call to the political duties of this world.

In *Christendom*[3] (March) George Every and Patrick McLaughlin write under a joint heading, "The Younger Generation Speaks." Bro. Every states the present youthful reaction from national politics and conceives a Christian organization "trying to reverse the drift of things by personal and corporate action in local affairs." The passive obedience of the non-jurors may here

[1] Burns Oates and Washbourne. 2s. monthly. [2] Macmillan. 5s. quarterly. [3] Blackwell. 2s. quarterly.

again give inspiration. The second article, " Ananias or Peter ?" again affirms the " smaller, more intimate spheres " in which Church social action must now be restricted. In both these articles the futility of Transport House, and therefore of all party politics, is too easily assumed. The direct Anglican concern with Westminster is unduly disregarded.

The East and West Review[1] (April) is full of interest and importance. Canon Roger Lloyd does well lucidly to expound the bearing of Toynbee's *A Study of History* upon the present work of the Church. Christian thinkers should be quicker to appreciate this great historical vindication of their faith. Two articles, by the Bishop of Zululand and the Rev. George Appleton, deal with the growth of an indigenous ministry in South Africa and Burma. Bishop Lee gives a wide survey of past development and present problems, such as the danger of a white-collared professionalism. Mr Appleton describes in detail the College of Holy Cross at Rangoon, where ordinands are given a high standard of English learning within the simple setting of Burmese life. The Rev. A. W. Blaxall writes on " The Care of the African Blind." His objective account disguises his own major share in a piece of Christian humanitarian work which shows heroic achievement against very heavy odds. Here again, perhaps, the most important aspect is towards indigenous evangelism. Mr Blaxall describes one of his blind men speaking to a few thousand heathen: " The very fact of his blindness was driving his message home with unparalleled force."

The Clergy Review (January) uncovers an interesting bit of history in the Rev. Andrew Beck's " Gregory XVI and the Poles." The Catholic clergy of Poland were sympathetic to the 1830 rising. Gregory was therefore faced by the dilemma of condoning the anti-catholic Russian Government or of encouraging the anti-catholic cause of liberalism. His intervention with the Tsar and the resulting concordat were papal triumphs, though we may discount the lurid overstatement of Wiseman.

A very interesting note on English Church history is provided in the Rev. Philip Hughes' " A Hierarchy that Fought," being a sequel to his previous " A Hierarchy that Failed." When Elizabeth acceded, fifteen out of the sixteen bishops stuck to their faith, ten of these being new bishops of the Marian restoration. They prove the achievement of Mary and Pole as " joint creators of a new type of English bishop." Anglican historians who have mostly tended to underrate this achievement should read the article.

E. W. Edmonds.

[1] S.P.C.K. 1s. quarterly.

SURVEYS

(A) CHURCH HISTORY

A survey of some recent books sent for review in THEOLOGY.

PRIDE of place in this survey should be given to the posthumous volumes of *Reformation Essays*[1] and *The History of the Reformation*,[2] by the late Professor J. P. Whitney. Pride indeed must needs be mingled with regret; for the range, accuracy and soundness of scholarship revealed in these volumes emphasize the loss which historical studies have sustained by the author's death. The *Essays* are reprinted as they were written for the most part thirty years ago. They illustrate some favourite themes of Dr Whitney's teaching—namely, continuity throughout the Reformation, Lutheranism and the episcopate, and the relationship of Erasmus to Luther—and since they represent his considered standpoints, they have not been rewritten to take account of cognate studies published since their original appearance. Both loss and gain are involved in this circumstance, for the reader does not enjoy the advantage of Dr Whitney's verdict on recent Reformation literature. Perhaps the most useful essay is that on " The Growth of Papal Jurisdiction before Nicholas I," a survey of an obscure and little-known period of papal history, which has been accessible hitherto only in the *Cambridge Historical Journal* for 1932. It reminds the reader of the author's profound knowledge of medieval history, and is typical of the catholicity of his scholarship.

The History of the Reformation presents the long-expected revision of the volume on *The Reformation* which Dr Whitney contributed to *The Church Universal* series in 1907. It is a matter of congratulation that he had completed the greater part of the revision before his illness. The present book is no mere second edition; it has been thoroughly revised, expanded and in parts recast. It is especially full on Germany and the Counter-Reformation, and it extends its survey chronologically to 1648 in accordance with the writer's conviction that no shorter period could express the full effects of the movement. It will remain by far the best textbook in English on the epoch of the Reformation. Its value to the professed student will be enhanced by its bibliography, which is full of useful suggestions for further reading. Mr R. E. Balfour prefixes a charming and appreciative memoir of Dr Whitney. The fact that Mr Balfour claims Dr Whitney's chief historical achievement in the field of medieval studies combines with this volume to emphasize the remarkable range and profundity of his learning.

The Reformation indeed continues to attract the attention

[1] S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

[2] S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

of both specialist students and general historians. To the former category belongs Mr H. B. Walters' *London Churches at the Reformation*[1] which embraces a publication, with brief introduction, of the returns from these churches to the Edwardine commission of enquiry in 1552 concerning the ornaments of churches. Its contents cannot be summarized shortly, for their value lies in the details of the inventories. The Church Historical Society and the S.P.C.K. in association with the Goldsmiths' and Fishmongers' Companies deserve the thanks of serious students for their publication of a volume which, though it can expect only a limited appeal, is of great value. Generally, the returns illustrate the effect of the religious changes of Henry VIII and of Somerset, particularly in the sale of ecclesiastical ornaments and the provision of the English Bible, Erasmus' Paraphrases and the Prayer Book of 1549.

The appeal of Mr H. R. Trevor-Roper's *Archbishop Laud*[2] will be to the student of seventeenth-century political and social history in England. In some respects it is a brilliant book, expounding and illustrating the social and political ideals of Laud, and explaining the part he played as a royal counsellor in trying to realize his principles in practice. In its detailed investigation of the political relevance of Laud's career it is invaluable and will establish its claim to be authoritative. The student of church history will find it marred by a contemptuous indifference to theological and ecclesiastical questions, which is paraded on every possible occasion. Notwithstanding, this eccentricity should not obscure the great value of the book. Within its self-determined limits it is indispensable; but its bias prevents it from aspiring to the position of a definitive biography of Laud.

All students of his period agree in paying tribute to Laud's zeal for sound learning and his beneficence to the University of Oxford. The importance of a learned clergy is abundantly illustrated by Professor D. C. Douglas' *English Scholars*,[3] a delightful survey of English historical scholarship between 1660 and 1730. The book covers a wide field; and the clergy play only a part in contributing to its riches. But their part is not mean, for it embraced Anglo-Saxon studies, both linguistic and historical, and the famous, if controversial, enquiry into the origins, development and constitutional position of the English Convocations.

"I know not any work an antiquary can do," observed George Hickes, "more serviceable to the church than this, which will show the faith and other chief doctrines of the English-Saxon church to be the same with ours, and perfectly answer that never-ending question: Where was your Church before Luther?"

[1] S.P.C.K. 25s. [2] Macmillan. 21s. [3] Jonathan Cape. 15s.

Bishop Henson has lamented recently the decline in the Church of England of the study of church history and the end of its succession of episcopal historians. Perhaps this partly accounts for the vogue of non-Anglican fashions in some circles. Professor Douglas' volume emphasizes the gain to the church after 1660 from its historian-prelates both in ecclesiastical controversy with papist and dissenter and in its relations with the state. Readers who are attracted to the book by its intrinsic merits may be drawn to accept its evidence of the utility of church history.

Learning continued to characterize the episcopate under the first two Hanoverians. This at least Professor Basil Williams' *The Whig Supremacy*, 1714-60,[1] the latest volume of the *Oxford History of England* series, allows. His survey of the Georgian church is much more impartial and favourable than is customary with historians of his period. He gives a very good general account of the established church, of the dissenting churches, protestant and papist, and of the beginning of the religious revival led by the Wesleys and Whitefield. It is a pleasure indeed to observe a standard History giving adequate space to religious movements and theological discussions. Professor Williams is not uncritical however, for a church which produced statesmen rather than saints does not commend itself to one who has lived some years in North Britain. But it escapes his notice that Lancelot Blackburne cannot be censured both because at York during his primacy " no confirmations are recorded " and because on the occasion of a confirmation in that diocese he asked for tobacco and ale in the vestry after the performance of the rite ! An illustration of religious standards during the Georgian age in relation to a particular aspect of social life is afforded by Mr W. B. Whitaker's *The Eighteenth-Century English Sunday*, 1677-1837,[2] which traces the various factors in Sunday observance and non-observance before and during the Methodist revival. Mr Whitaker has laid a wide variety of sources under tribute for his information, and presents a detailed, if at times somewhat pedestrian, survey of his theme, with especial reference to Methodist influence. His volume is a warning against hasty generalization, and presents valuable evidence to the student of social as well as of religious habits.

There is a far cry from the efforts of church and state in Hanoverian England to regulate Sunday observance to the history of the relations of these two powers in Europe from the apostolic age to the death of Pius XI. Yet no less ambitious a survey is the subject of Don Luigi Sturzo's *Church and State*,[3]

[1] Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d. [2] Epworth Press. 13s. 6d.
[3] Translated by Barbara B. Carter. Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press. 21s.

a volume which affords a singularly happy combination of the academic learning and practical activity in political life of its author. The breadth and erudition of this historical survey are most remarkable and evoke the warmest tribute from the reader. Don Sturzo traces the relations of the Christian church with the Roman Empire, both before and after its official toleration, describes the magnificent medieval conception of a *Respublica Christiana*, the Reformation principle of *cujus regio, ejus religio*, the progressive secularization of the modern state, and summarizes the twenty years' troubled history of post-war Europe. His book should be read carefully and thoroughly; it is fascinating, and will repay reading; but it defies summary. Moreover, Don Sturzo does not write to advocate any particular *nostrum*; he is mordantly critical of the contemporary deified totalitarian state; and he finds the dominating principle of the relations of church and state in our Lord's injunction to render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's.

> " This conception lies at the basis of the Christian experience. Every attempt to overstep such limits, from either side, has violated the laws of nature and those of revelation. The duality does not mean dualism, but it may become a dualism; it is not always diarchic, but it becomes a diarchy. Such is the story of two thousand years."

Relations between church and state in England during the thirteen and a half centuries since the landing of Augustine have been close and intimate; and of this there are many sermons in stones in the history of cathedrals, collegiate and parish churches. Fresh evidence of the riches of our national history is ever finding publication, and the second volume of Dr Jocelyn Perkins' *Westminster Abbey ; its Worship and Ornaments*,[1] and the appearance of the three volumes, *The Plate of St George's Chapel, Windsor Castle*, by E. A. Jones, *The Knights of the Garter*, 1348-1939, and *Organists and Masters of the Choristers of St. George's Chapel in Windsor Castle*,[2] by Dr E. H. Fellowes, constitute a mine of treasure for the historical student. Dr Perkins' book adds a further item to the debt which Westminster Abbey and its friends owe to his learning. It is almost unnecessary to say that it is characterized by the careful erudition of all his writings, and it is moreover beautifully illustrated. It deals with the history of the Rood screen, Pulpitum, Nave altars, St Edward the Confessor's chapel, the Chantry chapel of Henry V and

[1] Alcuin Club Collections, No. xxxiv. Oxford University Press. 25s.

[2] E. A. Jones: *The Plate of St George's Chapel, Windsor.* 5s. E. H. Fellowes: *The Knights of the Garter.* 6s.; *Organists and Masters of the Choristers of St George's Chapel in Windsor Castle.* General Editor, S. L. Ollard. Published for the Dean and Canons of St George's Chapel by S.P.C.K.

Henry VII's Chapel. It is full of interesting details, not always edifying—as the lamentable story of King Edward's chair sufficiently shows—but faithfully reflecting the varying standards of taste in the several centuries of history, to which the Abbey bears eloquent witness at the hands of such an interpreter as Dr Perkins. St George's Chapel, Windsor is almost a parvenu compared with the historic traditions of Westminster Abbey, but its briefer history is full of interest. Canon Ollard, his colleagues of the chapter, and the authors of these monographs likewise deserve the thanks of students of history for the handsome volumes now published. Perhaps the most generally interesting of the three is Dr Fellowes' biographical sketches of organists and masters of the choristers, especially the long tenure of office by Marbeck throughout the religious changes of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and the Elizabethan settlement. Dr Fellowes raises the question whether Marbeck was in minor orders or not, upon which the evidence is conflicting, though after the issue of the Edwardine Ordinal with its abolition of all grades below that of the diaconate it would be possible to describe a person in minor orders as " laicus " and yet for him to continue to draw the revenues of an ecclesiastical benefice without cure of souls.

These books make their appeal to specialist students, whereas the B.B.C. series of volumes, *An Outline of Church History from the Acts of the Apostles to the Reformation*, are intended for schools and for the inexpert reader. We have had occasion to offer a cordial welcome to the first two volumes, and, with one important exception, a similar reception may be accorded to the third, *Christian Thought and Life*.[1] It embraces a survey of various aspects of religious life and thought during the Middle Ages, contributed by experts, yet readily to be understood by the general reader. The exception is the impossible task allotted to Dr Archibald Main of dealing with the Renaissance and Reformation within one chapter. Luther, Calvin and Knox have all to be summarized, and not unnaturally Zwingli and the English Reformation have to be omitted entirely. The ludicrous disproportion between the task given to Dr Main and those of his fellow-contributors is evident. The question is inescapable: Has the B.B.C. Religious Director run away from the Reformation?

If this should unfortunately be the case, other authors do not share such reserve. Mr J. V. P. Thompson's *Supreme Governor, a study of Elizabethan ecclesiastical policy and circumstance*[2] presents a short and straightforward survey of political, administrative, and religious history of the church under Elizabeth.

[1] Edited by C. M. Duncan-Jones. George Allen and Unwin. 4s. 6d. [2] S.P.C.K. 6s.

His book makes no pretence to research or to originality, but he has read and pondered the available printed sources. He does not aspire to probe the theological mysteries of the age, and he thinks that the church's doctrinal position "in so far as it was defined at all, was mainly Zwinglian." His study is pleasant and readable. Mr R. R. Williams' *Religion and the English Vernacular* [1] offers a sound and interesting study, set against its medieval background, of the several elements in England from 1526-53 which led to the popularization of the Bible in English. He writes with enthusiasm and sober judgment, and his book is a valuable elucidation of its theme. Similarly Mr J. Y. Batley's *On a Reformer's Latin Bible* [2] embraces a useful essay on the *Adversaria* in the Vulgate of Thomas Bilney, to which he has prefixed a biographical sketch of the author. Both in the detailed study of the *Adversaria* and in his appreciation of Bilney, Mr Batley has made a distinctive contribution to his subject. These three small volumes indicate the perennial interest of the Reformation, and are doubly welcome therefore. Students of church history will find Dr A. J. Macdonald's article on "*Episcopi Vagantes* in Church History" in the *Church Quarterly Review* for January, 1940, both amusing and informative. The books received during the last half-year indeed suggest that the study of church history may be on the eve of a welcome renaissance.

NORMAN SYKES.

(B) SOUTH AFRICA

War, which tends generally to cement national unity, has brought to South Africa an accentuation of dissension and strife.

The rejection by Parliament of General Hertzog's neutrality motion, and the acceptance of General Smuts's amendment, shattered the United Party which a few years previously had brought together these two old opponents. Subsequent reflection has probably produced in the minority, if not the assurance, at least an uneasy suspicion, that neutrality, as General Hertzog proposed, without repudiation of undertakings to Great Britain, would have been in practice an impossible position; but there has been no mitigation of their bitter hostility to General Smuts and his new government. They have used all possible obstructive tactics in the House to delay the passage of essential war measures, and continue jubilantly to proclaim that the splitting of the United Party has reunited all the Dutch (Afrikaners), except a negligible minority of anglicized renegades, to work

[1] A Historical Study, 1526-53. S.P.C.K. 4s. 6d. [2] Deighton, Bell and Co. 4s.

for an independent South African republic, which shall never again be drawn into " England's wars."

But there has been no armed rebellion, as there was in 1914, and there is a good deal of evidence that the number of Afrikaners who support General Smuts is a much less negligible minority than has been claimed. Nor has effective agreement been reached between the Nationalist followers of Dr Malan and the Hertzog group who have seceded from the United Party; and some of these have not concealed their deep-seated reluctance to adopt the republican aim.

In fact, though South Africa is at war alongside the rest of the Dominions, internal politics continue to bulk so large that the war is almost forgotten. Moreover, General Smuts undertook, by the terms of his successful amendment to the neutrality motion, that South African forces should be used only for the defence of South Africa; and though there is still hot debate as to how far outside the Union military operations would fall within this limitation, there is no suggestion that they could be undertaken beyond the African continent, which up to the present has not been touched by active hostilities.

In South Africa, therefore, the war seems strangely remote, in spite of war news in the newspapers, civilian war efforts mainly financial, the expansion of the permanent air and land forces, and the more intensive training of the part-time Active Citizen Force. There is no sense of a united nation engaged in a common undertaking; on the contrary it is more than usually obvious how little cohesion there is between the various elements of which the population of the Union is composed.

From the Christian standpoint this problem of internal harmony is continually pressing. It is perhaps more particularly so for Anglicans, since their ethos demands, more clearly than those of other Christian bodies, a comprehensive national vocation, and they are uneasy in the position of a mere sect or " denomination " in a religiously neutral state. Our bishops and other dignitaries have assumed territorial titles, and we tend to think of ourselves as the " Church of South Africa," in spite of being a minority of the professing Christians in the English-speaking section (itself a minority of the white population) and certainly a minority also of the Native Christian community.

No other Christian body thinks in similar terms. The Roman Catholics appear to have little cohesion either within or between the several missionary Vicariates of which their ecclesiastical organization consists. It is said that they are making distinct progress among the Afrikaans-speaking, as well as the English-speaking, white population, and this should in time give them a definite footing among all the different groups, for their Native, Coloured and Indian work is strong,

and their churches know no colour-bar; but their emphasis is primarily upon the world-wide membership and autonomy of the Catholic Church, and has only secondary reference to the national or political society.

The Dutch Reformed Church concerns itself solely with the Afrikaans-speaking people, and with non-European missions separately organized in a missionary church distinct from their European system. It regards itself as the guardian of the " Afrikaner nation." Many, probably most, of its ministers and lay officials adhere to the " Christian-National " movement, which is closely associated with the National Party led by Dr Malan, himself formerly a Dutch Reformed minister, and aims at the establishment of a " Christian-National " republic.

The precise connotation of " Christian " in this conjunction is not easy to define. It means apparently less an adherence to Christian principles in human relationships, than an exclusiveness which would restrict citizenship to members of the Dutch Reformed Churches. Jews would be disfranchized. The Christianity of non-Europeans would not qualify them, for they, as well as Europeans of English speech and ancestry, would fail to satisfy the " National " half of the conjunction, while Roman Catholics would probably not be recognized as Christians at all; but such Europeans as embraced whole-heartedly the Afrikaner tradition, including language and religion, and disclaimed all other affinities, would probably be naturalized. Thus the effective dominance of the " Afrikaner nation," which claims exclusive right of possession of the country, would be secured.

It is a curiously short-sighted ideal, but it seems to have a strong appeal for many of the younger generation, especially the students in the universities and the younger teachers and ministers. It reflects a twofold dis-ease. There have been considerable industrial development and extensive migration from the country to the towns. This involves not only the reduction of the influence but also the partial break-up of the old-fashioned Boer society, and the assimilation of Afrikaner folk to the English-speaking urban population and to urban ways of life. They have abandoned the simple habits and pieties of the countryside, sit loose to the Church and its discipline, and some of them, ignorant and ill-prepared for the more strenuous life of the towns, have sunk into great poverty. The alien, the " uitlander," is thus held to have corrupted the fine Christian culture of Afrikanerdom. At the same time some of the more highly educated Afrikaners realize with a keen sense of frustration that economic power is chiefly in the hands of the " uitlanders," including many Jews; and the " Christian-National " movement includes an effort to reverse this preponderance by founding Afrikaner industrial undertakings and organizing Afrikaner co-operative societies. All their efforts are directed

towards maintaining themselves as a distinct and separate community, which shall dominate the whole of the varied society of South Africa.

The Dutch Reformed Church is thus allied only with one section of the population, though that the most numerous; it is in the main the buttress of exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, though it should be added that many of its devoted members do not support, and some, in private, strongly oppose, this policy. But in general the only kind of reconciliation between conflicting groups which it seeks is one in which the Afrikaner group would either swallow or dominate all the rest.

The other principal English-speaking bodies, Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregational, do not corporately look much beyond their own denominational concerns. There is a movement on foot for the union of these bodies which, if successful, would doubtless enhance their influence towards harmony in social relationships among the white population. When a member of the Dutch Reformed Church marries an English-speaking Christian the couple are more likely to find their religious home in one of these bodies than in the Dutch Reformed Church; and an Anglican partner will sometimes compromise in this way, so that both parties join an English-speaking body where the externals of worship resemble more nearly those of the Dutch Reformed Church.

In spite of all disruptive forces the process of assimilation is certainly going on. The ideal of bringing together the white population and building up a united South African nation (though no definite place in the national life is at present found for non-Europeans) continues to be the aim of many Afrikaans-speaking, and all but a small minority of English-speaking South Africans. There is no movement for British dominance corresponding with that of Afrikaner nationalism; indeed the people of English tradition are probably too reluctant rather than too ready to emphasize and maintain their own contribution and to claim their rights in the partnership.

But although this "two stream" policy of national unity ought to have a special appeal to Anglicans, as consonant with the true genius of Anglicanism, we are as yet too prone to think in terms only of our own present membership, and to regard our own communion chiefly as a bulwark of the English tradition. This is surely to fail to preserve an important quality of the Anglican outlook. Just as we have a specially vital concern with, and contribution to make to, the Christian Unity movement, so in the matter of national unity. Our tradition bids us seek not merely a concordat with the State which shall secure our liberty of faith and worship, but rather a position for the Church in which it may have a nation-wide function and responsibility. This is not, of course, to suggest that the Anglican body as it exists at present should have a position of special privilege,

though doubtless we are sometimes suspected of desiring it. But it is often forgotten that one aspect of the need of Christian unity is that a united Church would have not only the duty, but a greatly enhanced opportunity to integrate the political society. We tend to see Church and State as opposing forces. One of the contributions of Anglicanism to a completely rounded Christian outlook is surely an ideal of political unity, first national, then world-wide, in which such opposition would be done away.

The Dutch Reformed Church does indeed demand close co-operation between Church and State, but at present its conception of political unity tends to be confined to an exclusive concern with one group. Hence, though they are rightly impatient of a secular State, and demand that their nationalism should at least have the name of Christian, they are little interested in ideas of organic Christian unity. It seems to be the difficult vocation of the Anglican body, in a society torn with domestic strife, and beset by the insistent problem of right relations between black and white, to be the principal witness to the ideal of " unity, peace and concord," and to strive to promote it in State as well as Church.

C. H. S. Runge, C.R.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BACKGROUND. By Basil Willey. Chatto and Windus. 15s.

JONAS HANWAY. By John H. Hutchins. S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d.

Among the many volumes of eighteenth-century studies, social, literary and ecclesiastical, there was room for a book which would explore the metaphysical content of the age in its relation to these various aspects. Such a want is supplied by *The Eighteenth-Century Background*. Like its predecessor, which dealt with the seventeenth century, Mr Basil Willey's new book is the outcome of lectures delivered in the Faculty of English at Cambridge; and those who had the pleasure of listening to his lectures will find here, reproduced in the medium of print, those same qualities of lucidity, tolerance, *esprit* and *ordonnance* which characterize his approach to the English moralists.

" In the early and middle years of the eighteenth century," Mr Willey remarks, " the wealthy and educated of Europe must have enjoyed the nearest approach to earthly felicity ever known to man." *The Eighteenth-Century Background* traces the intellectual basis of this felicity, the complex of notions and attitudes within which the Augustan mind functioned (with what superb confidence !) and outside which (apart from a few eccentrics like Swift and Blake) it rarely trespassed. To the main features of this attitude Mr Willey gives the name of " cosmic Toryism." The eighteenth century was convinced that in the structure of the universe, as in the structure of society, the principles of hierarchical order were supreme, that cause and effect were knit together in a divine, if mechanical, pattern, and that all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

It was for this reason that Pope, and after him a host of lesser writers, could call upon his contemporaries to " follow Nature."

> First follow Nature, and your judgment frame
> By her just standard, which is still the same:
> Unerring *Nature*, still divinely bright,
> One clear, unchang'd, and universal light.

Nature was seen to be the outward, the cosmic expression of those notions of order and perfection which constituted the foundation of the Augustan *ethos*. It is the theme of " Nature " which Mr Willey explores in this volume, tracing its development from its emergence as a philosophical idea in the last decades of the seventeenth century, down to its culmination in the poetry of William Wordsworth.

The seventeenth century had seen the triumph of reason over superstition, the dispelling of the Gothic twilight, the explanation of Nature's laws by " the new philosophy," and the exaltation of the mind of man as the repository of reason. The Cam-

bridge Platonists formed a bridge between orthodox theology and the purer rationalism which was to guide the conduct, if not the speech, of the Augustan age. The Platonist compromise, however, speedily passed on into deism; and much of Mr Willey's space is taken up by a discussion of the various types of the deistic position. He points out that the function of science, while it dispelled the grosser forms of superstition, had been to strengthen the hypothesis of a Supreme Being. It had revealed the reign of design, order and law in the universe; and these qualities could proceed only from a directing mind.

From the cogitations of natural theology, Mr Willey moves on to an illuminating series of chapters on natural morality, as treated by Shaftesbury and Butler. Shaftesbury's part, insisting on the divine perfection of Nature, was to vindicate the ways of man, to defend human nature against the detractions of religion on the one hand, and of the more radical philosophers on the other. Shaftesbury exalts the natural moral sense of man: a moral sense which, he says, can function apart from the consideration of divine rewards and punishments. " True religion " should be based on Nature rather than on revelation. Butler, on the other hand, is the champion of orthodoxy in the eighteenth century, as befitted a prelate of the Church of England. The Church, however deeply imbued itself with unbelief, could not overtly cut the ground from under its feet by admitting that revelation was otiose. Butler effects an identification between the God of Nature and the God of Revelation in a peculiar way. " Instead of proving, in the manner of the physico-theologians, that all things are bright and beautiful, and that the good God made them all, he shows that Nature and Revelation are both baffling and in a sense unsatisfying, and that it is as such that they both appear to be the products of the same mind."

While the philosophers ruminated on the metaphysical sources of their own felicity, the unfortunate masses were born, laboured and died in a state of acute misery. As Thomson put it, contrariwise,

> while thus laborious crowds
> Ply the tough oar, Philosophy directs
> The ruling helm.

How tough the oar was is shown in Mr Hutchins' book on the life and work of Jonas Hanway. This is a work of documentation rather than of biography; yet from the record of his labours there does emerge a picture of the mind and character of the great philanthropist. Stolid, unimaginative, profoundly respectable, Hanway nevertheless possessed the Christian virtues of faith and charity and the pagan virtues of fortitude and magnanimity. He built slowly; like the snail, he was quick to draw his horns in at the breath of adverse criticism; but like that persistent animal, he continued to move quietly on to his goal. Hanway

had a hand in almost every movement of social reform in his day: the Foundling Hospital, the Magdalene House, the Marine Society, the bettering of workhouse conditions. It is a terrible story of social wrong, of ignorance and complacency, which these pages unfold. Everywhere Hanway's efforts met with opposition from those who held that reform would undermine the basis of society: that the creation of houses for repentant harlots would lead to immorality, that the rescue of exposed infants would encourage the poor to increased fecundity, that a more humane workhouse system would foster the shiftless and the sturdy beggar. But Hanway's work endured. "All the work of Jonas Hanway was directed towards knitting the lives of Englishmen into one pattern. He attempted to build a cohesive people in which each respected the rights of the others, each laboured for the general as well as personal benefit and all shared common ideals through worship of the same God. . . . As an individual he was soon forgotten, but his methods and work were more influential in succeeding generations than those of the writers of *belles lettres*."

BERNARD BLACKSTONE.

PASSION AND SOCIETY. By D. de Rougemont. Trans. by M. Belgion. Faber and Faber. 12s. 6d.

THE BRIDE OF CHRIST. By Claude Chavasse. Faber and Faber. 8s. 6d.

For the present writer to criticize Mr Belgion as a translator from the French would be impertinent, so we may proceed at once to consider his original. M. de Rougemont's book consists of a moral thesis coupled with an historical thesis. As they are of very unequal value, the purpose of this review is to deter readers either from neglecting the moral because they perceive the weakness of the historical, or from debauching their sense of evidence by accepting M. de Rougemont's history because they approve his ethics; that is, to counteract the effect of the exciting sentences with which Messrs Faber and Faber have adorned the jacket of the English version.

The historical thesis is that the earliest medieval literature of Courtly Love was not really an expression of sexual passion at all, but the exoteric and symbolic expression of a wish for death and pain, itself the product of a widespread pagan Eros-mysticism, mediated to the Provençal poets through the Catharist heresy. The very best that can be said for this theory is that it is not formally impossible. The fatal principle of the author's method is quite frankly stated on p. 109 of the French text (though not, oddly enough, on the corresponding p. 122 of the English). It is that, since the Cathari were suppressed, documents are

naturally lacking, and in their absence *toutes les hypothèses sont permises*. In fact, no hypothesis is permissible except that which covers the facts with the fewest possible assumptions, and M. de Rougemont is falling into what I call the Gyges Fallacy (If there were an invisible man in the room it would look empty—The room does look empty. Therefore there is an invisible man in it). He lays enormous stress on certain unmotivated partings of the lovers in the *Tristan* romance; but loss of motivation easily occurs in stories through misunderstanding of the original, and the vast superstructure which M. de Rougemont builds is at the mercy of Occam's razor. He traces the lover's dislike of dawn in the Provençal *Alba* to some Manichæan doctrine of the duel between Day and Night—which would make Ovid a Manichæan. When a lover prefers his mistress to the Papal and the Imperial thrones, this seems to M. de Rougemont " to display the unmistakable demeanour of negative mysticism " (p. 103); but the same argument would find the *via negativa* in the song from the *Misanthrope* (*j'aime mieux ma mie*) or even in the English " I have a thirst I wouldn't sell for a thousand pounds." The whole argument is maintained only by the continual predisposition to suppose every bush a bear. But there is an even deeper objection. The author bases his thesis time after time on the existence of delays and obstacles in all love stories, which, for him, illustrate a secret desire for suffering and death, in seeming oblivion of the fact that delays and obstacles play an equally important part in stories that have nothing to do with love—in *Treasure Island* or the *Philoctetes* or *Beowulf*. The total absence from M. de Rougemont's thought of any general theory of story as such leads him to mete hard measure to story-tellers. If they end unhappily, that is a death-wish. If, after delays and obstacles, we reach a happy ending, this is a compromise between the " romantic " and the " middle-class " wishes (p. 238). The author hardly seems aware that the formula " obstacles followed by a happy ending " includes the *Odyssey*, *Aeneid*, *Gierusalemme Liberata*, *Tempest*, *Pilgrim's Progress* and nearly every *märchen* in the world; indeed, he seems unaware of the very existence of literature which is not erotic.

Nevertheless this book is indispensable. Its moral thesis can easily be separated from its historical, provided that we do not equate origins with values. Romantic passion may, or may not, have originated as M. de Rougemont maintains. But God can bring so much good out of evil, and Satan so much evil out of good, that to know its origins would help us little in estimating its present value. On this problem M. de Rougemont writes one of the most cleansing and penetrating sermons I have read for a long time, and maintains with eloquence the incompatibility between the Christian conception of marriage and the modern notion according to which every marriage must have " falling in love " as its efficient, and worldly " happiness " as its final,

cause. An English reader, bred on Patmore, Chesterton, and Mr Charles Williams, may sometimes wonder whether Romanticism has not a greater internal power of shedding its own errors than M. de Rougemont supposes; but all of us need to learn, almost daily, that Eros ceases to be a demon only when he ceases to be a god (p. 321).

Mr Chavasse's short book—I wished it longer—traces the Nuptial Idea in theology from Old Testament times down to Alexander Cruden. Its main theological thesis, which I am too ignorant to criticize, is that the true conception of the Church as Bride has been largely obscured by misconceptions which assign that high position to the individual Christian soul or to the Blessed Virgin; but that it was recovered in its purity by the Anglican Reformation. An extremely interesting Appendix, entitled "The Marriage in the Mission Field," discusses how far the *Hieros gamos* found in many contemporary mythologies can be used as a preparation for the true Nuptial Idea, but warns us that Nuptial theology will be dangerous to pagans who, like the Hindoos, already have the idea of the soul bride. Mr Chavasse semes to me to have successfully avoided the dangers inherent in his subject and produced an edifying book.

C. S. Lewis.

Ideals of Religion. By A. C. Bradley. Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

There may be by now some young readers ready to appreciate the late nineteenth-century idealism as an historical phenomenon. They will find this popular presentation of its religious doctrine a useful introduction to the matter. Or there may be some more elderly who will see in it the moving epitome of dear familiar truths. Those between the two ages may have to overcome an initial reluctance in approaching an easy and confident statement of doctrines with which their youth was fed and from which their maturity revolted. These are the Gifford Lectures of 1907, appearing now for the first time. Perhaps the distinguished lecturer withheld their publication because he saw the gathering forces of a criticism which demanded a more defensive treatment of the idealist positions.

Dr Andrew Bradley, the literary critic and Shakespearean scholar, not only viewed his own subject in a philosophical light, but found solace also in more purely metaphysical thinking, as the malicious apocryphon in the *Masque of Balliol* tells us:

> I am Mr Andrew Bradley:
> When my liver's doing badly
> I take refuge from the brute
> In the blessed Absolute.

It is perhaps an accident that these lines suggest the practical and religious attitude to Idealism which appears twenty years

later in the Gifford Lectures. It is in this attitude that their interest lies, rather than in the sketch of Absolutist metaphysics, which flows from the lecturer's tongue so easily and so fast, it is more like an incantation than an argument. It may serve to evoke an accepted idea, but hardly to assist the unconvinced inquirer, indignant to hear so many fundamental questions begged in turn. But the author confesses that this sketch is merely a sketch: it is with religion as such that he is more deeply concerned; and his account of it opens auspiciously. It is neither speculation nor feeling, but worship, and centred in the will. It is a deliberate attitude towards supreme reality, having its fulfilment in acts which are not so much those of the worshipper as of God acting in him. It is intellectual in so far as it must grasp the reality with which it concerns itself; but as it does not do this for the sake of speculation, its ideas can be practically right if they mediate the correct attitude, even though they are speculatively deficient. We have here the usual idealist device of treating all theology as " language of devotion " and turning over to another discipline the study of the underlying truth.

Dr Bradley's order of argument in the earlier part of his book is highly significant. He begins with the subjective pole—religion as an activity of man. We have in fact, he thinks, an ideal of religion, such that we can use it as a standard and pronounce certain types defective. It may or may not be that the universe is such as to justify religion; none the less, we know what it is, and we can see what sort of a universe would justify it: hardly, for example, that allowed us by Seeley or by Mill. Religion requires an actually existent omnipotent perfection, with which she can become spiritually united. Evidently nothing more, for what more could we have ? Evidently nothing less, for what less could satisfy ? It is enough to know, then, that ultimate reality is infinite, spiritual, and one, and that we are not divorced from it. All the rest is only edifying metaphor.

We said that this line of argument is highly significant. For in fact it is evident that the God of this idealism is the hypostasis of human religiosity as is its metaphysical absolute of human philosophizing. It is not surprising then that the two hypostases fall into such close agreement and are so easily identified. The ideal of religion is to be actuated by an infinite being towards an infinite being. Granted. But we have defined nothing but a problem. Problem—to find a Being who is such, and who thus unites us with himself. Idealism simply states the definition of the problem as the knowledge of the answer. The word God *means* the reality which solves man's problem, defined as the nature and conditions of the problem demand.

Now it may be right to argue that if God were not we should not know Him even as a lack. He is there for us, and has created the need for Himself. But not necessarily (and this is where idealism begs the question) by being to us already and really that which

is so lacked. Perhaps, on the contrary, we feel the lack because the God who might be in us, uniting us to Himself, is still without us in the relevant respect, but has made Himself known in an historical revelation. He has taught us, perhaps, to long for God in us, but He may not be there yet except by faith, except by hope, and then only because Christ has died, and risen from the dead.

It is a piece of textbook wisdom that idealism in the popular and the philosophical senses should not be confused. In the case of this doctrine the error is not so grave. For here is a philosophy which starts from the subjective fact of man's aspirations and concludes that sufficient reflection will assure him in the possession of what he longs for, since all the time he has it in the bottom of his heart. Political "idealism" has no other principle.

AUSTIN FARRER.

AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By R. G. Collingwood. Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.

Professor R. G. Collingwood is the most interesting figure in the world of contemporary British philosophy, and this by virtue of what he is as much as of what he teaches. Classical scholars and archæologists, who know him as the leading authority on Roman Britain, are sometimes unaware that the man who has done so much in their own field is actually the Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in the University of Oxford. The fact that he is so is an encouraging sign that it is still possible for philosophy to avoid academic isolation and find living contact with other spheres of thought. In this *Autobiography* the author describes briefly but clearly the influences which have brought this about in his case, the principal themes of his philosophic reflection, and the intimate way in which these have been suggested, moulded, and confirmed by his historical studies.

It is a curious fact that British philosophers have always neglected those problems, whether logical or metaphysical, which arise in connexion with history. While such problems have been discussed in Germany for 150 years, and have found their way into the works of outstanding writers like Fichte and Hegel, our own country before the present generation had hardly anything to show except the small early essay by F. H. Bradley on *The Presuppositions of Critical History*, and even that was not really about history at large, but about what a critical historian ought to do with miracle-stories when they turn up in his sources. Professor Collingwood is the first who has taken seriously the fact that historical study has methods and presuppositions of its own, and has tried to examine these as the philosophers of the seven-

teenth century examined those of natural science. In the aim of his work, and in the combination of philosophic and historical learning which supports it, he resembles the German writer Wilhelm Dilthey; but, while the range of Dilthey's interests was wider, Professor Collingwood excels him in the unity and precision of his thought.

To philosophers, the most interesting and challenging part of this book will be chapter vii, where the " logic of question and answer," which the author has derived from his historical studies, is applied to philosophy itself, leading to new conclusions as to the aim and method of philosophy. Every true statement, we read, is the right answer to some question, and it cannot be understood unless we understand the question to which it is the answer. Every philosophic statement is a philosopher's attempt to answer some question, and can only be understood and criticized if we first grasp the question. Now, the questions which philosophers ask are subtly but genuinely different in different ages. Hence it follows that we cannot honestly pretend to criticize the work of earlier philosophers until we have gone through the exercise—essentially an historical exercise—of putting ourselves in their place. This is important, and greatly needs to be repeated in the present generation, when philosophers are tending to despise the history of philosophy. But then the author goes on to say that the philosopher is himself an historian, and philosophy is an historical study. For it is concerned not with the answers to specific questions, which may be true or false answers, but with the ultimate presuppositions which make it possible in the first instance to ask or answer any questions at all. About such ultimate presuppositions we cannot properly ask whether they are true or false, but only whether or not they are really presupposed. Different things are, in fact, presupposed at different times. And thus philosophy is resolved into the history of fundamental beliefs.

The reader may be surprised at this conclusion, and may be disposed to quarrel with the view that there is no question about fundamental beliefs except the question of fact: whether they are really believed. The treatment of this part of Professor Collingwood's position in the *Autobiography* is too short, in view of its novelty, and may result for some readers in a certain obscurity. The point is expounded more at length in the author's more recent *Essay on Metaphysics*.

The *Autobiography* is written with its author's customary vigour of language, which may be disliked. There will be some, however, of those who have known the " realist " school of philosophy in Oxford, who will think that the strictures here passed upon it are in no way undeserved. The history of that school has been a peculiarly dark chapter in the story of *la trahison des clercs*. The closing chapter of the book, where the author launches out into politics, seems unworthy of the rest.

The writer concludes too confidently about facts which are capable of more interpretations than one, and his vigorous style of denunciation degenerates into journalism.

H. A. Hodges.

God the Living and the True. By D. M. Mackinnon. Man: His Origin and Destiny. By E. L. Mascall. Signposts Nos. 2 and 3. Dacre Press. 1s. each.

I wrestled with Mr Mackinnon's book; went to bed trying to unravel it; and then wrestled again. I cannot say that I have yet understood him fully, but his general purpose is clear. Assuming the conclusion of the first book in the series (and to note this assumption is of first importance), the author attempts to "present the God who is the subject of the Christian Gospel." He exhibits the "given-ness" of the Gospel, and the necessity of faith if reason is to remain true to itself. Our need, *as we discern it*, is not to be taken as the measure of the divine initiative. We must rediscover our finitude, and that rediscovery can come only in so far as we see that in the Cross all our aspirations are condemned. That act of God at once condemns and restores the whole historical series, and requires a completely new way of looking at the world. The true task of apologetic is therefore to "confront man with this act of divine judgment," that event in history wherein God "enters the sphere of human decision" and "becomes the object not of intellectual scrutiny but of contempt and rejection." This confrontation renews the understanding. God in history points towards the comprehension of God as He is in Himself, through the demand, *made in history*, that man shall recognize that his being is contingent upon the being of God. This is the work of the Mediator. "The descent of God is the condition of the ascent of man"; and it is through His initiative and not through our achievement that we are brought from death to life.

On a third reading Mr Mackinnon's thought became clearer. I think many of his difficulties are due to the limitation in space inevitable in such a series as "Signposts." I shall therefore not join issue with him over some points which under other conditions he might have argued more fully. For although I think he would accuse me of "denying the horizon," and although I know I have worshipped "God the living and the true" in words which Mr Mackinnon uncompromisingly condemns, I know also that his main thesis is true. "We do well to remember how terrible a book is the New Testament."

Mr Mascall's book in the "Signposts" Series is easier reading than Mr Mackinnon's. His theme is the reinstatement of

Christian anthropology. Modern man has no faith in anything; his civilization is frustrated in every direction—economics, politics, education, amusements, personal morality. The Christian Church has therefore both opportunity and responsibility to proclaim that man is God's creature, made in His image, to give Him glory, and to be assimilated to Him. The recognition that man so made is a real unity of body and soul enables us to see his proper relation to other beings, to things and to money. This true scheme of life is the complete inversion of the existing scheme: Money, Things, Man, (God ?). The true scheme shows that the Christian doctrine of the Family comes out of the Christian doctrine of God, and has profound consequences for human sexual relations. The inverted scheme is a symptom of the fact that man is diseased in his inmost being; but God offers him healing—offers him salvation which, while it must " come from without, must be done from within."

Mr Mascall has not attempted to break new ground, but he has brought together into a short compass much that is true and of first importance, and this fact, coupled with a frequent telling turn of phrase, gives real value to his little book.

H. C. L. Heywood.

Science and Wisdom. By Jacques Maritain. Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press. 10s. 6d.

This book contains three studies, " Science and Wisdom," " The Philosophy of Nature " and " Philosophy in Faith," which are the text, in part rewritten, of three lectures delivered at Rome at the *Angelicum* in March, 1934. " Reflections on Moral Philosophy," which is in addition to the studies named, is an answer to objections brought against M. Maritain's account of moral science by two theologians, Fr Thomas Deman and Fr J. M. Ramirez.

One cannot but be grateful to the publishers for the part they have had in making the work of M. Maritain accessible to a large public. It is regrettable therefore that a method of literal translation does such slight justice to the accuracies of the author's intellectual style. It is a matter for regret, also, that the valuable bibliographical index and the index of names have been omitted from this English edition of *Science et Sagesse*.

Those who have read *The Degrees of Knowledge* will perhaps be willing to agree that there is a soul of order at the heart of M. Maritain's philosophical activity. *The Degrees of Knowledge* was a magnificent example of metaphysical wisdom determining the essential order of the sciences, from the highest to the lowest, in terms of formal objects and formal light, of *quod* and *quo*. *Science*

and Wisdom derives also from a soul of order. The author tells us in the preface that these studies form a connected whole. Each can be understood only when read in conjunction with the others. While the formal order of the sciences was the principal object of *The Degrees of Knowledge*, so that the chief effect of the book is that of a sudden illumination, in *Science and Wisdom* the sciences are considered, no doubt, in their formal order and in their passage through history, but what is properly illuminative in this account is accompanied by what one might call, by analogy, a certain purging and cleansing intention of a practical kind. For this book is more adapted to a wide public than *The Degrees of Knowledge*.

The first study, "Science and Wisdom," is the meditation of a Christian philosopher on two of those original notions which must be grasped if one would understand, however dimly, the articulations of our spiritual history. Having shown in what sense one calls wisdom a science or knowledge, the author develops the theme that if the ancient world appears to us as the world in which there are wisdoms in competition—for we find, in the ancient world, the wisdom of Moses and the prophets which is the true wisdom of eternal life, the human and rational wisdom of the Greeks who had the beginnings of all our reasons, the wisdom of India which was the wisdom of salvation and of holiness achieved by an effort of the energies immanent in nature —then the Christian world will appear to us as the world of synthesis and of wisdoms ordered in hierarchy—for, according to the doctrine that St Thomas has made classical, there are three essentially distinct sorts of wisdom which are ordered in hierarchy: infused wisdom or the wisdom of grace, theological wisdom and metaphysical wisdom. Below these the philosophy of nature exemplifies a type of imperfect wisdom, which is superior, however, to the special sciences, which are not wisdom in any sense of the word.

Averroism, by which is meant an effort to separate philosophical wisdom from theological wisdom, has been a disrupting influence in the world since the thirteenth century, working against that order of the intelligence which was for a while realized historically as the order of medieval wisdom. The action of purging and cleansing to which allusion has been made becomes evident, not only in the remarks on the work of conciliation of present-day science and wisdom with which M. Maritain closes his first study, but also and more particularly in the two following studies. Of these the first, "The Philosophy of Nature," is at once an examination of the philosophy of nature, its relations with the special sciences and with metaphysics, the consequences of its neglect, and, so far as the principles are concerned, a resolution of the disorder for which we may thank Descartes—*i.e.*, the erection of physico-mathematical knowledge into a philosophy of nature. In the second study, "Philosophy in Faith," M. Maritain takes up

as a whole the problem of Christian philosophy which had been the subject of an earlier essay, *De la Philosophie Chrétienne*. Christian Philosophy is nothing but philosophy itself situated in the climate of explicit faith and of baptismal grace. This name indicates thus a certain complex, " an essence taken in a certain state, under conditions of performance, of existence and of life, for or against which one is in fact obliged to make a choice." It should be clear from this that the study *Philosophy in Faith* (*Ita ergo philosophandum est in fide*: John of St Thomas), examining as it does the place and limits of reason in the hierarchy of wisdoms, is of immediate importance at the present time, when questions of essence will be asked with increasing insistence. *Science and Wisdom* cannot fail to be of the greatest help to all those who will be desiring to live in the order of wisdom.

BRIAN COFFEY.

A HISTORY OF THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY. Vol. III. 1500-1800. By K. S. Latourette. Eyre and Spottiswoode. 18s.

The first volume ended with the year 500, when the Roman Empire in the West collapsed and the Church took up the task of moulding the barbarian nations which had occupied its provinces; how it accomplished the task was described in the second volume. In the third volume the curtain rises on the year 1500. With convincing vigour the author describes the parlous condition of Christendom. The great sees of the East and of Africa were submerged by Islam or were barely existing as tiny islands. A cool observer would have rated Christianity's chances of survival very low. The kingdoms of the West were insignificant compared with the Ottoman Empire or China under the Ming dynasty. Their religion was suffering from internal weakness. The Papacy had suffered terribly from its sojourn at Avignon. The moral degradation of Renaissance statecraft was marked. The Church had relied on orders of society whose relative importance was to sink, and it was doubtful whether it could gain the same influence on the new commercial classes.

As it turned out, Christianity was to make a marvellous recovery in the next three centuries. It was to harness the abounding vitality of the Western European races and to carry the religion of Jesus all over the world. It is this point of view that renders the present book so topical and even exciting. The third crisis is yet to come with the French Revolution; the fourth is with us now. Serious as it is, the Church has been through similar crises before.

Once again Professor Latourette shows an encyclopædic knowledge of the subject and superb efficiency in marshalling facts in an interesting manner. Three things stand out clearly. Nearly everywhere the heavy hand of the State is shown pressing hard on the Church. In Spanish America the Church's influence mitigated the cruelty of the conquerors considerably. In large parts of the world missions were subject to severe persecution. Truly the mystical Body is "always bearing about the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest."

The beautiful American printing, by which many words are packed into a line with perfect legibility, deserves notice.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages. By Fritz Kern. Translated by S. B. Chrimes. Blackwell. 12s. 6d.

Lay Investiture and its Relation to the Conflict of Empire and Papacy. By Z. N. Brooke. Humphrey Milford. 2s.

Professor Kern's *Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht im früheren Mittelalter* (1914) has long been known to English scholars as an invaluable survey of the development of the theories of the Divine Right of Kings and of the Right of Resistance to Tyrants from the eighth to the thirteenth century, but it has not hitherto been accessible in translation, neither is it completely so accessible even now, nor has "the full measure of Professor Kern's profound scholarship" been made available to English readers. In Dr Chrimes' excellent translation, about seven-eighths of the footnotes have been omitted, and of the thirty-eight appendices only the titles are supplied. However justifiable in the present instance (for, as Dr Chrimes points out, the labour of translating the whole of this material would have been extremely heavy, and the cost of publishing it prohibitive: the argument that much of the notes and appendices consists of references to older authorities which this monograph has effectually superseded is more contestable), his decision is none the less to be regretted. The Rev. R. E. Scantlebury, in his translation (1934) of the Abbé Constant's *La Réforme en Angleterre*, was certainly less drastic: but in order to have the author's notes in their entirety, it is necessary to possess the French edition. Professional historians may be excused for hoping that this policy will not be widely followed. It is a policy with which it is impossible not to sympathize, but it is also a policy of which it is not easy to approve. At the same time, it brings its compensations. Thus, the English version of M. Constant's work includes the translation of two articles contributed by the author to publications less easily accessible, and br ings the bibliography up to date.

Similarly, Dr Chrimes' translation of *Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht*, although for some reason unexplained it suppresses the delicate little joke about " allerhöchstselig " on p. 138 of the original text, incorporates a number of revisions supplied by Professor Kern himself: it is accompanied by a translation of a long and important article on *Recht und Verfassung im Mittelalter* (Law and Constitution in the Middle Ages) contributed by Professor Kern to the *Historische Zeitschrift*, vol. cxx, 1919, pp. 1-79: and it is introduced by an extremely serviceable and illuminating essay by the translator, concluding with an excellent brief survey of the literature of the subject subsequent to 1914: with few exceptions (such as Professor P. E. Schramm's *History of the English Coronation*, translated by Dr L. G. Wickham Legg in 1937), most of the works enumerated, and notably Professor Marc Bloch's *Les Rois Thaumaturges* (1924), still await translation.

Professor Kern takes as his point of departure the fully developed theory of Divine Right in the seventeenth century, a theory combining several distinct ideas which may be summarized under three heads: the divine right of monarchy; the divine right of kings, deriving both from hereditary right and from divine consecration (*a Deo coronatus*); and the principle of absolutism (the royal power as arbitrary and unlimited). He investigates the historic evolution of these different strands of the developed doctrine; and he has succeeded in establishing that absolutism, like its antithesis, popular sovereignty, represents an aberration from the main current of medieval political theory, which culminates in the principle of constitutional monarchy. He then proceeds to discuss the limitation of the monarch by Law, and the various aspects of the Right of Resistance. Particularly noteworthy is his demonstration that the theoretical basis of the *Widerstandsrecht* is pre-feudal; consequently, it is not purely nor even primarily contractual. All this is immensely valuable and important. Its one limitation is that the author does not go back far enough into history: the Christian and pre-Christian antecedents of the conflicting doctrines, although not unnoticed, lie outside the proper scope of his enquiry. None the less, this is a notable addition to the series of *Studies in Medieval History* (edited by Mr Geoffrey Barraclough), of which it is the third in order of appearance. A useful summary of Professor Kern's conclusions, which Dr Chrimes has fortunately not omitted in his translation, will be found on pp. 135-143.

One of the most important episodes in the development of monarchical and anti-monarchical theories in the Middle Ages is the conflict between the Empire and the Papacy at the end of the eleventh century. The furious letter addressed by the Emperor Henry IV to Pope Gregory VII (January 24, 1076) is a statement—the more significant, because so clearly unpremeditated—of the Divine Right position: while, on the other hand, the dangerous doctrine of Manegold of Lautenbach that

a king may be deposed if he begins to act the tyrant, "since it is evident that he has broken that contract by virtue of which he was appointed," marks the emergence of a new and radical challenge to the royal power.

This conflict is generally known in history as the Investiture Controversy, or the War of the Investitures. But Dr Z. N. Brooke, who is the leading English authority on the period, has demonstrated in his recent Raleigh Lecture (*Proc. Brit. Acad.*, vol. xxv, 1939), now available in pamphlet form, that this traditional title is misleading and inadequate. From the outbreak of the conflict to the death of Henry IV in 1106, "it should be obvious that the struggle is not about investitures at all." It opens, not with Gregory's original prohibition of lay investiture in 1075, but with Henry's attempt to control the appointment to the Archbishopric of Milan in 1071. The real point at issue was whether Church or State was to exercise control over the appointment of bishops and over the bishops when appointed. Lay control, which had centuries of tradition behind it, involved the appointment to high ecclesiastical office of men whose primary qualification was a capacity for secular administration; and it was symbolized by the ceremonial investiture of the bishop by the king with the ring and staff, the emblems of his office and dignity. Gregory recognized in that symbolic ceremony the first and most obvious point of attack: but the conflict immediately widened into a major struggle between the *regnum* and the *sacerdotium*. The death of Henry IV in 1106 brought this chapter to a close; Empire and Papacy were once more in communion, but now for the first time the lay investiture issue, raised by Gregory VII in 1075, became primary. By concentrating upon it, the Papalist party lost their ultimate aim, which was to secure the appointment of the right men as bishops. "The king had something with which to barter; by renouncing investiture he gave up the shadow and retained the substance—all that part of the customary procedure which ensured his control over the appointment of bishops and over the bishops when appointed. So Gregory's purpose was defeated when what he intended as a means became an end. It was a Pyrrhic triumph for the Papacy when the king was left in possession of the field" by the Concordat of Worms (1122), which closed the dispute over lay investiture once and for all. Dr Brooke's pamphlet is the most lucid interpretation of the conflict that has yet been published; it revolutionizes the traditional presentation of the issue, and its importance is out of all proportion to its size.

CHARLES SMYTH.

THE BENEDICTINES OF CALDEY. By Peter F. Anson. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 7s. 6d.

Twenty-seven years have passed since the majority of the Benedictines of Caldey Island transferred their allegiance from Canterbury to Rome. From that partition of the original community have emerged Nashdom in the Church of England and Prinknash under the Roman obedience.

The events of those troublous days in the spring of 1913 can now be seen in a truer perspective. Mr Anson was himself a monk of Caldey who passed over to Rome, though he has not remained a Benedictine in his new environment. The readers who anticipate a bias in the Roman direction will be agreeably surprised. The author has been entirely objective and scrupulously fair in his account of the events which led to the "conversion," and the Anglican protagonists are appraised honestly and without prejudice.

The history of the Caldey community is the story of a young man's ideal which found a concrete expression. Fr Aelred Carlyle had been drawn to the Religious Life from his earliest days. At the age of nineteen he began his attempt to live the Benedictine life. He gathered around him a group of young men and, helped by such influential laymen as Mr Athelstan Riley and the late Lord Halifax and with the approval of Archbishop Frederick Temple, he finally established his community after many vicissitudes on Caldey Island in 1906. There they remained until 1913 when twenty-seven of the monks made their submission to the Roman Church, leaving something less than a handful to pick up the threads and start again.

A careful study of the correspondence between Abbot Aelred and Bishop Gore—who had been invited by the community at the suggestion of Archbishop Davidson to act as Visitor—leads to an inevitable question. Is it possible that the Benedictine life can be lived within the Church of England? and if it is possible, as Nashdom seems to prove, why did the Caldey monks withdraw to Rome? Leaving aside all personal considerations—both Abbot Aelred and Bishop Gore were sincere and honest men who approached a situation from opposite ends and could, because of their honesty, find no kind of compromise—the answer to the question lies in the meaning we give to "the Benedictine life." Undoubtedly and inevitably among Roman Benedictines there has been development since the days of St Benedict. These developments have been part and parcel of the wider theological and devotional growth of the Roman Church. Development within the Church of England—certainly during the last four hundred years—has not been along exactly the same lines. Caldey under Abbot Aelred set out to restore the Benedictine life in the Anglican Church. Obviously it could not put the clock back and take literally the "primitive observance" as its pattern. A more developed type

of Benedictinism suitable to the twentieth century was essential. The community had the Roman example before them and around them. They had neither the patience nor perhaps the ability to work out in theory or practice such lines of development from the primitive Benedictinism as might be legitimate within the Church of England. Nashdom is doing this; Caldey failed. This book is, from the Roman point of view, the story of an inevitable experience. From the Anglican standpoint it is the record of a great disappointment.

This book is noteworthy not only for the fairmindedness of the author but also for his sympathetic attitude towards the revival of the Religious Life in the Church of England. He has contributed an introductory essay on this subject, which is only marred by too frequent references to members of Anglican communities who have joined the Church of Rome. The book is illustrated with eight delightful drawings by the author.

H. L. Hubbard.

SHORTER NOTICES

Two Knights. By Edward Rockcliff. Sheed and Ward, 3s. 6d.

The Pilgrim's Progress through a modern world in modern dress is apt to be a shoddy affair. Mr C. S. Lewis recently made his *Regress* infinitely more variable and brilliantly entertaining than most attempts to bring his Progress up to date; but here Father Rockcliff has attempted the latter task. His pilgrim is not the pious individual that the romantic historian loves to portray, and his armoury is necessarily larger; and so the book manages to make up in human breadth what it lacks in mystical fervour and evangelical zeal. It avoids prettiness very prettily, and gives us the medieval setting as it strikes a modern mind.

Ashley Sampson.

Ben Jonson and the First Folio Edition of Shakespeare's Plays. By Gerald H. Randall. Benham and Co. 1s.

This brief history of the first folio of Shakespeare's Plays, and the place of Ben Jonson's Shakespeare's world, is an item for which it is difficult to discover the *raison d'être*—unless it is to be conceived as a glowing testimony to Jonson. That it certainly is; and it is undertaken (as are too few such productions) in a thoroughly lively and wideawake manner. Not all will agree with its conclusions; but it is something to be able to make a challenge and awaken a response in so brief a space as this is

able to allow to so vast a problem. The sense that it leaves behind of having created more problems than it solves is inevitable, but while it lasts it interests. It is vital.

Ashley Sampson.

The Work of Jesus in Christian Thought. By Alexander McCrea. Epworth Press. 6s.

Mr McCrea has addressed groups of University students, and has found them interested in theology but muddled, and especially muddled about the atonement. So, for such beginners, he has made " a survey of the main historical interpretations of Christ's death." He prefaces this, first with some reflections upon why the word of the Cross is foolishness to many, and then with a general discussion of the Crucifixion and the Resurrection. The rest of the book is a full survey of the treatment of the Death of Christ in the New Testament, in the Fathers, in Augustine, Anselm, and Abailard, and in the works of recent theologians.

There is much in this book that is important and helpful, but I am doubtful whether it will achieve its object. The style is often far from attractive, and the thought not seldom lacks clarity. It seems to me possible that some of the beginners for whom Mr McCrea writes would be confused or even put off. I hope I am wrong.

H. C. L. Heywood.

The Creed of a Christian: Being Monologues upon Great Themes of the Christian Faith. By N. Micklem. S.C.M. 5s.

To gain from this book what it has to give not only must the preface be read carefully and remembered, but also its rather cumbrous sub-title must be noted. These tell you how to read what Dr Micklem says he wrote so unwillingly. This is not a book to summarize, still less is it a book to criticize in any detail. It is a book which talks about " what it means for us to believe that Christ is risen." And the only basis for a judgment on such a book is the quite unknowable one of what it does to its readers. Throughout the book, but especially for me in its first half, there are sentences which assault one's complacency or light up one's blindness. It is alive with worship, and searching in its challenge. " He who does not say Yes says No." At least one reader can only voice his gratitude to Mr Hugh Martin for his importunity and to Dr Micklem for doing violence to his inclinations.

H. C. L. Heywood.

An Essay on Critical Appreciation. By R. W. Church. George Allen and Unwin. 10s. 6d.

There is an accredited vocabulary for theology, philosophy and science but none for æsthetics, and so works on this subject tend to be obscure. Dr Church has an important contribution to make towards æsthetic theory and he obviously knows his subject thoroughly, but clarity and brevity are not his strong points. He undertakes the difficult task of explaining the meaning of Beauty and of one's experienec of Beauty. A chapter on " Aspects of Æsthetic Form " is interesting and informative, and contains a refutation of the opinion that a work of art must be judged as a whole. " Only the Absolute reality is an absolute whole, and the Absolute is not available to us by the relationable way of thought that is ours " (p. 159). The principal ideas of the book are illustrated by reference to Titian's *Bacchus and Ariadne*. The distinction between a " felt beauty " and a " critical appreciation " of Beauty is worthy of careful consideration.

Patrick Cowley.

CORRESPONDENCE

CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

Mr Bethell's main position is so important that I hope you will allow me at some future date to deal with it in a full-length argument. For the moment, therefore, I will only say: (1) That I made no reference to his previous paper for the worst of reasons and the best of causes—namely, that I had forgotten it. For this negligence I ask his pardon. On looking back at the relevant number of Theology, I see from marginalia in my own hand that I must have read his contribution with great interest; for my forgetfulness I can only plead that a great many things have happened to us all since then. I am distressed that Mr Bethell should suppose himself deliberately slighted. I intended no disrespect to him. (2) That my position " logically implies . . . total depravity " I deny simply. How any logician could derive the proposition " Human nature is totally depraved " from the proposition " Cultural activities do not in themselves improve our spiritual condition," I cannot understand. Even if I had said (which I did not), " Man's æsthetic nature is totally depraved," no one could infer " Man's whole nature is totally depraved " without a glaring transference from *secundum quid* to *simpliciter*. I put it to Mr Bethell that he has used " logically implies " to mean " may without

gross uncharity rouse the suspicion of"—and that he ought not to use words that way.

To Mr Carritt I reply that my argument assumed the divinity of Christ, the truth of the creeds, and the authority of the Christian tradition, because I was writing in an Anglican periodical. That is why Dominical and patristic sayings have for me more than an antiquarian interest. But though my attribution of authority to Christ or the Fathers may depend on premisses which Mr Carritt does not accept, my belief that it is proper to combine my own reasonings with the witness of authority has a different ground, prior to any decision on the question, "Who is authoritative?" One of the things my reason tells me is that I ought to check the results of my own thinking by the opinions of the wise. I go to authority because reason sends me to it—just as Mr Carritt, after adding up a column of figures, might ask a friend, known to be a good calculator, to check it for him, and might distrust his own result if his friend got a different one.

I said that culture was a storehouse of the best sub-Christian *values*, not the best sub-Christian *virtues*. I meant by this that culture recorded man's striving for those ends which, though not the true end of man (the fruition of God), have nevertheless some degree of similarity to it, and are not so grossly inadequate to the nature of man as, say, physical pleasure, or money. This similarity, of course, while making it less evil to rest in them, makes the danger of resting in them greater and more subtle.

The salvation of souls is a means to the glorifying of God because only saved souls can duly glorify Him. The thing to which, on my view, culture must be subordinated, is not (though it includes) moral virtue, but the conscious direction of all will and desire to a transcendental Person in whom I believe all values to reside, and the reference to Him in every thought and act. Since that Person "loves righteousness" this total surrender to Him involves Mr Carritt's "conscientiousness." It would therefore be impossible to "glorify God by doing what we thought wrong." Doing what we think right, on the other hand, is not the same as glorifying God. I fully agree with Mr Carritt that *a priori* we might expect the production of whatever is "good" to be one of our duties. If God had never spoken to man, we should be justified in basing the conduct of life wholly on such *a priori* grounds. Those who think God has spoken will naturally listen to what He has to say about the where, how, to what extent, and in what spirit any "good" is to be pursued. This does not mean that our own "conscience" is simply negated. On the contrary, just as reason sends me to authority, so conscience sends me to obedience: for one of the things my conscience tells me is that if there exists an absolutely wise and good Person (Aristotle's φρόνιμος raised to the *n*th) I owe Him obedience, specially when that Person, as the ground

of my existence, has a kind of paternal claim on me, and, as a benefactor, has a claim on my gratitude. What would happen if there were an absolute clash between God's will and my own conscience—*i.e.*, if *either* God could be bad *or* I were an incurable moral idiot—I naturally do not know, any more than Mr Carritt knows what would happen if he found absolutely demonstrative evidence for two contradictory propositions.

I mentioned Hooker, not because he simply denied that Scripture contains all things necessary, but because he advanced a proof that it cannot—which proof, I supposed, most readers of THEOLOGY would remember. " Text-hunting " is, of course, " Puritanical," but also scholastic, patristic, apostolic, and Dominical. To *that* kind of charge I venture, presuming on an indulgence which Mr Carritt has extended to me for nearly twenty years, to reply with homely saws: as that an old trout can't be caught by tickling, and they know a trick worth two of that where I come from. Puritan, quotha !

Yours faithfully,

C. S. LEWIS.

MAGDALEN COLLEGE,
OXFORD.
May 7, 1940.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: E. Bevan, *Holy Images* (7s. 6d.); John Laird, *Theism and Cosmology* (10s. 6d.); W. E. Hocking, *Living Religions and a World Faith* (10s.).

E. ARNOLD: W. Brown, *Psychology and Psychotherapy* (12s. 6d.).

BURNS OATES: J. F. D'Alton, *Selections from St John Chrysostom* (8s. 6d.); J. Kearney, *Treasure in Heaven* (6s.); A. Roche, *The Light of the Anxious Heart* (6s.); C. Lattey (Ed.), *Religion and Science* (7s. 6d.).

JAMES CLARKE: D. C. Mitchell, *The Gospel of the Cross* (2s.).

DACRE PRESS: G. B. Bentley, *The Resurrection of the Bible* (1s.).

GOLLANCZ: Paul Fröhlich, *Rosa Luxemburg : Her Life and Work* (Left Book Club, 2s. 6d.).

HOLY CROSS PRESS: R. S. Hubbard, *How to Read the Bible* (25c.).

METHUEN: E. B. Redlich (Ed.), *The Christian Heritage*: An Anthology (6s.).

MOWBRAYS: H. G. Blackburne, *The Coming of the King and other Verses* (9d.).

NISBET: D. R. Davies, *The Church and the Peace* (1s.).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: D. M. MacIver, *Leviathan and the People* (8s. 6d.).

Published by the Author at 4, Glendower Street, Monmouth: Walter Roberts, *The Forbidden Tree* (1s.).

S.C.M. PRESS: G. H. Woolley, *A Pocket-book of Prayers* (1s.); W. M. Horton, *Contemporary English Theology* (8s. 6d.).

SHEED AND WARD: C. C. Martindale, *The Sweet Singer of Israel* (8s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: C. E. Whiting, *Nathaniel Lord Crewe, Bishop of Durham* (1674-1721) (16s.); F. W. Head, *Our Catholic Heritage in the Church of England* (1s.).

UNITED EDITORIAL LIMITED: A. V. Phillips, *Spain under Franco* (3d.).

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